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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation study, I examine three issues in applied health economics within
the context of the Medicare program. Medicare provides health insurance coverage to the
elderly and the disabled. Although the core components of Medicare have remained largely
intact since its introduction in 1965, the program has undergone a number of changes
in recent decades. During this period, program enrollment and costs have increased
dramatically, and Medicare continues to play an increasingly prominent role in the U.S.
health care system. In this study, I examine several integral aspects of the Medicare
program, and, in doing so, I contribute to our understanding of health economics more
broadly.
In Chapters 1 and 2, I focus on the interaction between the incentives of private health
insurers that operate in the Medicare program and externalities from prescription drugs.
More specifically, I test the hypothesis that integrated plans that provide coverage for drug
and non-drug expenditures within the Medicare program internalize negative externalities
from prescription opioids; because of the breadth of coverage that these plans provide, they
have an incentive to consider adverse health outcomes that are linked to opioid use. Using
Medicare Part D drug utilization data, I find evidence that supports this hypothesis in
Chapter 1; relative to enrollment in a stand-alone drug plan, enrollment in an integrated
plan lowered the probability of high dosage opioid use linked to hospitalizations by 32
percent in 2008 and 2009.
In Chapter 2, I extend my research question towards benefit design for prescription
opioids. Because benefit design directly impacts enrollee drug use, I hypothesize that
xii
integrated plans that operate within the Medicare Part D program structure benefits in
a way that limits enrollees’ use of high dosage opioids. To examine this issue, I test
for differences in benefit design for opioids across integrated plans and stand-alone drug
plans. I find that, relative to opioids covered by stand-alone drug plans, opioids covered
by integrated drug plans are more likely to have a quantity limit restriction. Further-
more, conditional on a quantity limit restriction, opioids covered by integrated plans have
lower opioid dosage allowances relative to opioids covered by stand-alone plans. These
results reinforce the finding that integrated plans internalize negative externalities from
prescription opioids, and they provide evidence of a mechanism through which this occurs.
In Chapter 3, I shift gears and focus on the interaction between the onset of Medicare
at age 65 and mental health care utilization and mental health outcomes.1 Using data from
the National Health Insurance Survey, I examine whether the changes in health insurance
coverage rates that occur at age 65 are accompanied by changes in mental health outcomes.
I employ a regression discontinuity design to test for changes in perceived financial barriers
to mental health care, visits with mental health professionals, and self-reported mental
health. I find that the onset of Medicare at age 65 is accompanied by a substantial decline
in self-reported barriers to receiving mental health care, especially among individuals with
lower levels of educational attainment. However, I find no changes in visits with mental
health care professionals or measures of self-reported mental health.




Private Health Insurer Incentives and Prescription
Opioid Use: Evidence from Medicare Part D
1.1 Introduction
Private health insurers play an increasingly prominent role in the provision of public
health insurance benefits. Since the 1980s, Medicare beneficiaries have had the option to
enroll in a private managed care plan in place of traditional fee-for-service Medicare. In
the 1990s, states began contracting with private managed care organizations to deliver
Medicaid benefits. Since 2006, the Medicare Part D program has provided coverage for
prescription drug expenditures, with benefits administered entirely by private insurers. In
recent years, both the Medicare and Medicaid programs have seen a significant increase
in the percentage of beneficiaries enrolled in private plans. In 2017, nearly one-third
of Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in a private Medicare Advantage (MA) plan; 40
percent of Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in a private stand-alone drug plan; and, 70
percent of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in a private managed care plan (Gruber,
2017; Jacobson et al., 2017; KFF, 2019). The growing presence of private insurers in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs has increased the importance of better understanding
how these firms’ incentives interact with beneficiary welfare.
In this study, I examine one channel through which private health insurer incentives
1
may align with improved enrollee health outcomes. Integrated health insurance plans
that provide comprehensive coverage for a range of health care services have an incentive
to consider the substitutability or complementarity across different modes of treatment. I
test the hypothesis that integrated plans internalize externalities from prescription drugs.
I exploit the unique institutional design of the Medicare Part D prescription drug
program to test my hypothesis. Broadly speaking, two types of private insurers operate
in the Part D program; Medicare Advantage Part D plans (MA-PDPs), which provide
comprehensive coverage for drug and non-drug expenditures, and stand-alone Part D plans
(SA-PDPs), which provide coverage for prescription drugs only. Because of the breadth
of coverage that they provide, MA-PDPs have an incentive to consider externalities from
enrollee drug use. Conversely, SA-PDPs do not face the costs of hospital or outpatient
care and have no incentive to consider these externalities.
I examine the interaction between private health insurer incentives and a class of drugs
that are associated with negative externalities – prescription opioids. Because MA-PDPs
face the costs of hospital care, these plans have an incentive to consider adverse health
outcomes linked to opioid use. SA-PDPs do not face the costs of hospital care and have
no incentive to consider these adverse health outcomes. Using a 20 percent sample of
Medicare beneficiaries from 2008 through 2015, I examine whether MA-PDP enrollment
affects measures of opioid use. I motivate my analysis with evidence from the medical
literature on the link between high dosages of opioids and adverse health outcomes.
An empirical challenge in determining whether MA-PDP enrollment affects opioid use
is that plan enrollment is non-random. There is a long history of favorable selection into
MA plans; as a result, a na¨ıve comparison of opioid use across MA-PDP enrollees and
SA-PDP enrollees may capture both plan efforts to manage care, as well as unobservable
differences in health status. I introduce a novel strategy to identify the causal effect
of MA-PDP enrollment on measures of opioid use. My identification strategy leverages
two policy changes that resulted in higher payments to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans
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operating in 72 “treatment” counties relative to MA plans operating in 178 “control”
counties. As a result of these higher payments, plans operating in treatment counties
were motivated to enroll a greater number of Medicare beneficiaries relative to plans
operating in control counties. I exploit variation in payments to MA plans operating in
treatment and control counties to generate an instrument for MA-PDP enrollment that
is plausibly exogenous to beneficiary health status.
I find that MA-PDP enrollment lowers the probability of opioid use by 8.4 percent
relative to SA-PDP enrollment. Conditional on any opioid use, MA-PDP enrollment also
lowers intensity of opioid use. In particular, I find that MA-PDP enrollment reduced the
likelihood of high dosage opioid use by 32 percent in 2008 and 2009. There are several
mechanisms through which MA-PDPs may have limited enrollees’ use of high dosage
opioids. For example, plans could have worked with providers to ensure safer prescribing
levels or excluded high dosage opioids from their formularies. While I am unable to
determine the exact mechanism in this study, I am examining this issue in related work.
However, I find that MA-PDP enrollment lowered the probability of propoxyphene use, a
high dosage opioid that was withdrawn from the market in 2010. The effect of MA-PDP
enrollment on reducing propoxyphene use was the primary factor in lowering dosages
during this period.
This study is most closely related to recent work by Baker et al. (2020), who also
examine the impact of MA-PDP enrollment on opioid use. They find that MA-PDP en-
rollment lowers the probability of opioid use; however, conditional on any opioid use, they
find no effect of MA-PDP enrollment on intensity of use. My analysis differs from theirs in
several ways. First, our studies examine different samples of Medicare beneficiaries. My
identification strategy relies on variation in payments to MA plans operating in smaller
metropolitan areas. Their study exploits a discontinuous change in payments to MA plans
that operate in counties that are part of larger metropolitan areas with populations of
250,000 or more. Given that my analysis focuses on beneficiaries who reside in smaller
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metropolitan areas, my findings may be of particular importance to policymakers, in light
of the opioid epidemic’s effect on rural America.
Second, while their study focuses on opioid use during 2014, I examine opioid use
during the years 2008 through 2015. This longer period of analysis allows me to test for
differences in the effect of MA-PDP enrollment on measures of opioid use over time. This
issue is particularly salient given the shift in the medical community’s reassessment of
safe opioid prescribing guidelines that occurred during these years.
Third, while their study uses opioid days supply to gauge intensity of use, I identify
measures of opioid use that are associated with negative externalities. Although the use
of opioids for non-cancer pain remains controversial, these drugs continue to serve as an
essential treatment for pain management. I harness evidence from the medical litera-
ture on the link between high opioid dosages and adverse health outcomes to distinguish
between “safe” and “dangerous” measures of opioid use.
This study adds to a growing literature that examines the interaction between pri-
vate health insurer incentives and externalities from prescription drugs in the Medicare
program. Both Lavetti and Simon (2018) and Starc and Town (2019) show that relative
to SA-PDPs, MA-PDPs offer more generous coverage for drugs that have been shown to
reduce hospitalizations. In light of a rich literature that documents price-sensitivity in
the demand for prescription drugs, their findings indicate that MA-PDPs internalize pos-
itive externalities from prescription drugs. I find that MA-PDP enrollment reduces the
probability of high dosage opioid use, indicating that integrated plans internalize negative
externalities from prescription drugs. This finding may be of importance to policymak-
ers as both integrated and fragmented drug plans continue to play a larger role in the
administration of public health insurance benefits.
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1.2 Background
1.2.1 The Medicare Part D Program
The Medicare program provides nearly universal health insurance coverage to indi-
viduals aged 65 and older and to those receiving disability insurance through the federal
government. The program consists of four components, although there is significant over-
lap. Medicare Part A provides coverage for the costs of inpatient hospital care, while
Medicare Part B provides coverage for the costs of physician and outpatient hospital care.
Medicare beneficiaries have the option to obtain coverage for the services covered under
Parts A and B through either a private Medicare Advantage (MA) plan or through tra-
ditional fee-for-service Medicare (TM). MA plans (formerly referred to as Part C and
+Choice plans) receive a monthly per-enrollee payment from the federal government in
exchange for providing coverage for the services covered under Parts A and B. Under TM,
medical benefits covered under Parts A and B are administered directly by the federal
government.
The fourth component of Medicare is the Part D program, which provides coverage
for prescription drug expenditures. Part D benefits are administered entirely by private
insurers. Broadly speaking, there are two types of plans that operate in Medicare Part D:
Medicare Advantage Part D plans (MA-PDPs) and stand-alone Part D plans (SA-PDPs).
MA-PDPs are integrated into parent MA plans, while SA-PDPs provide coverage for
prescription drug expenditures only. The typical enrollee in an MA-PDP receives coverage
for the services covered under Parts A, B, and D through a single private insurer, while
the typical enrollee in an SA-PDP supplements enrollment in TM with prescription drug
coverage through a private stand-alone plan.
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1.2.2 Integrated Plans and Externalities
MA-PDPs and SA-PDPs face different incentives regarding externalities from pre-
scription drugs. Because of the breadth of coverage that they provide, MA-PDPs have an
incentive to consider externalities from prescription drugs into other modes of care. SA-
PDPs provide coverage for prescription drugs only and have no incentive to consider these
externalities. For example, if an MA-PDP enrollee requires emergency medical attention
as a result of prescription opioid use, the MA-PDP would have to cover the costs of both
the initial drug and the emergency care. In contrast, SA-PDPs are not responsible for
emergency care and have no incentive to consider this downstream cost.
Two recent studies examine whether MA-PDPs internalize positive externalities from
prescription drugs (Lavetti and Simon, 2018; Starc and Town, 2019). The analysis in these
studies is motivated by the previous findings that consumers are price-sensitive in their
demand for prescription drugs, and that underutilization of certain medications may lead
to inpatient hospitalizations (Chandra et al., 2010; Swartz, 2010). These findings suggest
that MA-PDPs have an incentive to set low cost-sharing requirements for drugs that
reduce hospitalizations, to ensure that financial restrictions do not prevent enrollees from
accessing these drugs. Because SA-PDPs do not face the costs of hospital care, they have
no such incentive.
Both Lavetti and Simon (2018) and Starc and Town (2019) test the hypothesis that
integrated plans internalize positive externalities from prescription drugs. Using Part D
utilization data, Starc and Town (2019) find that MA-PDP enrollees pay 10 percent less
in out-of-pocket costs than their SA-PDP counterparts for drugs used in the treatment
of conditions such as asthma, diabetes, and high cholesterol. Using Part D benefit design
data, Lavetti and Simon (2018) show that the out-of-pocket costs faced by MA-PDP
enrollees for a similar set of “spillover drugs” are six to eight percent lower than those faced
by SA-PDP enrollees. The findings from both studies suggest that MA-PDPs internalize
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positive externalities from prescription drugs that may reduce hospitalizations.
In this study, I also examine whether integrated MA-PDPs internalize externalities
from prescription drugs. However, I focus on a class of drugs that have been linked
to negative externalities – prescription opioids. A related study by Baker et al. (2020)
finds that MA-PDP enrollment reduces the likelihood of any opioid use. My analysis
differs from theirs in several ways. First, relative to the sample of beneficiaries used in
their analysis, my analysis focuses on beneficiaries who reside in smaller metropolitan
areas. Second, while their study focuses on beneficiary opioid use during 2014, I examine
beneficiary opioid use during the years 2008 through 2015. The period of analysis in my
study overlaps with the height of both opioid prescribing levels and negative externalities
from prescription opioid use. Third, while their study largely focuses on the effect of
MA-PDP enrollment on extensive margin opioid use, my analysis focuses on the effect of
MA-PDP enrollment on intensive margin measures of use. I distinguish between “safe”
and “dangerous” opioid use by identifying measures of intensity of opioid use that are
associated with adverse health outcomes.
1.2.3 Negative Externalities from Prescription Opioids
Prescription opioids have a complex history in the U.S. health care system. For most
of the 20th century, these drugs were generally reserved for the treatment of individuals
suffering from the most severe forms of pain, including post-surgical and terminal cancer
patients. During this period, the medical community was generally in agreement that
any benefits from opioid treatments for non-cancer pain were outweighed by the health
risks associated with using these drugs, including respiratory failure and addiction. This
perception began to shift in the late-1980s and into the 1990s following the designation
of pain severity as a “fifth vital sign” by major medical groups, and the growing belief
among physicians that pain is a debilitating condition associated with high rates of health
care utilization and large costs to society (Dworkin and Sherman, 2001; Rosenblum et al.,
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2008). In response, pharmaceutical companies developed an array of opioid formulations
and touted these drugs as safe and effective treatments for chronic non-malignant pain
(CNMP).
Efforts to address CNMP were especially salient among the elderly. This segment
of the population faces high rates of chronic pain stemming from their susceptibility
to conditions that become more common later in life, such as arthritis. In 2006, the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) began issuing a post-discharge survey
to Medicare inpatients with questions regarding the adequacy of their pain treatment.
Concomitant with the growing focus on pain management was the increased acceptance,
if not encouragement, of the use of prescription opioids as a preferred treatment over
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) for elderly patients with CNMP (AGS,
2009). This position was echoed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in its 2008
“Analgesic Ladder Guidelines” (WHO, 2008).
The increased acceptance of opioids for the treatment of non-cancer pain was fol-
lowed by a substantial rise in year-to-year opioid prescriptions. Between 1997 and 2002,
the number of OxyContin prescriptions, a potent long-acting oxycodone formulation, in-
creased from 670,000 to 6.2 million (Van Zee, 2009). By 2006, one in five adults in the
United States was prescribed an opioid (Kelly et al., 2008). Between 1998 and 2006, more
than three percent of elderly individuals were estimated to be regular users of these drugs
(Stagnitti, 2009). The rise in opioids for medical purposes was accompanied by an increase
in adverse health outcomes from opioid use, forcing the medical community to reevaluate
the appropriateness of these drugs for the treatment of non-cancer pain (Rosenblum et al.,
2008). In particular, a number of researchers began examining the link between opioid
dosage levels and adverse health outcomes (Franklin et al., 2005; Fernandez et al., 2006).
Between 2009 and 2011, researchers established many of the safety thresholds for
daily opioid dosages that continue to be recognized today. This literature documented
a heightened risk of adverse health events among individuals taking daily opioid dosages
8
of 50 morphine milligram equivalents (MME) or more (Dunn et al., 2010; Bohnert et al.,
2011). Because of their susceptibility to bone fractures, researchers found that the elderly
are particularly vulnerable to the side-effects of high opioid dosages, including dizziness
and sedation (Saunders et al., 2010).
The use of opioids for non-cancer pain remains controversial, and opioid prescribing
guidelines emphasize the importance of considering each patient’s risk profile when choos-
ing the most appropriate treatment. Despite the complicated history of these drugs, and
the ongoing opioid epidemic, opioids remain an essential treatment for pain management.
However, the shift in the medical community’s assessment of safe dosage prescribing levels
presents an empirical framework to test the hypothesis that MA-PDPs internalize negative
externalities from these drugs. MA-PDPs face the costs of hospital care and have an in-
centive to limit enrollee exposure to high opioid dosages, while SA-PDPs provide coverage
for drug expenditures only and have no incentive to consider these negative externalities.
I test for differences in measures of opioid use and dosage levels across MA-PDP and
SA-PDP enrollees to determine whether MA-PDPs internalize negative externalities from
these drugs.
1.3 Data and Outcomes
1.3.1 Cohort Construction
I use a 20 percent sample of Medicare beneficiaries from years 2008 through 2015
to test for differences in measures of opioid use across MA-PDP and SA-PDP enrollees.
Beneficiaries are selected for inclusion in the sample if their Social Security Number ends
in a zero or a five, and generally appear longitudinally across all data years in which
they are enrolled. The initial sample consists of 15.3 million beneficiaries and 86.1 million
observations. I exclude a small fraction of observations that contain no information on
Part D enrollment. I then impose several sample restrictions to make the cohorts of MA-
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PDP and SA-PDP enrollees more comparable (Table A.1). I exclude beneficiaries who
do not currently, or did not originally, qualify for Medicare benefits on the basis of age
(i.e. the disabled); beneficiaries who are also enrolled in Medicaid (dual-eligibles); and,
Part D low-income subsidy (LIS) recipients. These restrictions remove from the analysis
observations that correspond to individuals with characteristics that are likely correlated
with both opioid use and plan choice in unobservable ways. For example, Medicare
beneficiaries under the age of 65, who generally obtain coverage through disability status,
exhibit significantly higher rates of opioid use than beneficiaries aged 65 and older (Morden
et al., 2014). These individuals are also much more likely to be enrolled in an SA-PDP
and to be a recipient of the LIS than their over-65 counterparts (Cubanski et al., 2016).
I also exclude from the analysis beneficiaries who are not enrolled in the same Part
D plan throughout the calendar year. These beneficiaries either gain or lose Part D
coverage after the start of the year, or they change plans over the course of the year. I
exclude these observations for two reasons; first, because I construct measures of opioid
use at the annual level, outcomes are scaled for beneficiaries with partial-year coverage.
Scaling outcomes may generate erroneous values, especially for beneficiaries who either
gain coverage late in the calendar year or lose coverage early in the calendar year. Second,
changes in Part D coverage are generally restricted to an open enrollment period (October
through December), and take effect the following year. The motivating factors for within-
year changes in Part D plan enrollment are unclear. After removing observations subject
to these restrictions, the remaining sample consists of 48 million observations.
I impose several additional data cleaning restrictions. I exclude beneficiaries who re-
side outside of the U.S.; observations with missing or unknown gender; and, beneficiaries
with less than 12 months of enrollment in TM (Parts A and B) or MA during the cal-
endar year. Following Afendulis et al. (2017), I drop observations that correspond to
beneficiaries enrolled in a private fee-for-service (PFFS) plan. Historically, PFFS plans
have been exempt from network requirements; as a result, these plans faced a different
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set of incentives than other types of MA plans (Frakt et al., 2009).1 Finally, I exclude
observations that correspond to beneficiaries under the age of 65 or over the age of 99.
I link a large set of geographic covariates to the cohort of Medicare beneficiaries. At
the county-level, I obtain information on unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS); information on poverty rates, household income, and disability rates
from the Census Bureau; and, information on population density and health care market
characteristics from the Area Health Resource File. I obtain information on metropolitan
and core-based statistical area populations from the Census Bureau. Finally, I obtain
information on state prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) from Buchmueller
and Carey (2018). PDMPs collect data on prescriptions for controlled substances, in-
cluding prescription opioids, to identify inappropriate prescribing levels. The final cohort
consists of 7.7 million beneficiaries and 35.4 million observations.
1.3.2 Outcomes
I obtain information on prescription opioid use from the 2008 through 2015 Part D
Event (PDE) files. Each observation in the PDE files represents a prescription fill. The
data contain the corresponding national drug code (NDC) for each prescription, the date
the prescription was filled, and the days supply of the prescription. I identify opioid drugs
by NDC code, and I limit the data to entries that correspond to the list of drugs detailed
in Table A.2. I link information on opioid prescription fills from the PDE data to the
cohort of Medicare beneficiaries by a unique beneficiary identification number and year.
I generate four measures of opioid use at the annual level. First, I create an indicator
for any opioid use during the calendar year. I next generate several measures that are in-
tended to capture intensity of opioid use. These measures are constructed from two fields:
morphine milligram equivalents (MME) and the days supply associated with each pre-
1I identify plan type by the “Contract ID” and “Plan ID” fields. Plan identifiers are encrypted for data
year 2012; I drop 2012 beneficiaries who were enrolled in a PFFS plan at any point prior to, (2008-2011),
or after, (2013-2015), 2012. The results are robust to excluding data year 2012 from the analysis.
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scription. MME is a commonly employed measure that standardizes dosage levels across
opioids of different ingredients, strengths, and routes of administration into equivalent
milligrams of morphine. For example, 90 tablets of 10 milligrams of oxycodone has an
MME of 1,350 (10*90*1.5).
I construct three measures of intensity of opioid use at the annual level from the MME
and the days supply fields. First, I compute the annual daily morphine equivalent dosage
(MED) for each beneficiary by dividing the sum of morphine milligram equivalents across
all prescriptions used during the calendar year by the total days supply corresponding to
these prescriptions. Second, I identify the maximum daily MED used during the calendar
year. Third, I create an indicator for whether a prescription for 50 daily MED or more
was used during the calendar year. For enrollee i in year t with n opioid prescriptions,






















The annual daily MED field captures average opioid dosages throughout the calendar
year, while the maximum daily MED and 50 or more daily MED fields capture individual
prescriptions that correspond to high dosages. For example, a beneficiary with three
opioid prescriptions corresponding to 20, 30, and 70 daily MED (with equivalent days
supply) has annual daily MED use of 40, maximum daily MED use of 70, and is flagged
for using a prescription for 50 daily MED or more.
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
An empirical challenge in using Part D utilization data to determine whether MA-
PDPs internalize negative externalities from prescription opioids is that plan enrollment
is non-random. There is a long history of favorable selection into MA plans; while there
is evidence that this has declined in recent years, plans continue to attract healthier en-
rollees to increase profit margins (McWilliams et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2014). This
issue is particularly salient when examining prescription opioids, as opioid use is strongly
correlated with poorer health status (Cicero et al., 2009). As a result, a na¨ıve estimate
of opioid use on MA-PDP enrollment will capture both differences in underlying health
status across enrollees, as well as any efforts by MA-PDPs to internalize negative ex-
ternalities from these drugs. I develop an instrument for MA-PDP enrollment that is
plausibly exogenous to beneficiary health status. I construct this instrument from two
sources of policy variation: county benchmark payment floors to MA plans and the 2000
reclassification of metropolitan America.
1.4.1 County Benchmark Payment Floors
MA plans receive a monthly, per-enrollee payment from the federal government in
exchange for providing coverage for the services covered under Parts A and B. These
payments are calculated from two inputs: legislatively determined county benchmark
amounts and an enrollee-specific risk-adjustment factor. County benchmark amounts are
based on the level of lagged Medicare spending for the population of TM enrollees residing
within an MA plan’s county of operation. This amount is then scaled by an individualized
beneficiary risk score that adjusts for demographic characteristics and health status. The
per-enrollee payment thus functions to capture local health care spending levels through
the benchmark amount, and to disincentive MA plans from actively seeking to attract
healthier beneficiaries through the individualized risk score.
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In an effort to increase MA presence in areas with historically low TM spending levels
(in particular, rural areas) the federal government introduced a county benchmark floor of
$367 in January 1998 (Table 1.1, Figure A.1). Beginning in March 2001, the government
authorized a second benchmark payment floor that set a 10.5 percent premium on the
original (inflation-adjusted) payment floor; however, the higher payment floor applied
only to MA plans operating in counties that were part of metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) with populations of 250,000 or more. The second payment floor is often referred
to as the “urban floor,” as it was intended to increase MA presence in more populated
metropolitan areas.
1.4.2 The Reclassification of Metropolitan America
In 2000, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) introduced a new classification
system for defining metropolitan America. The new system was designed to account for
changes in economic, commuting, and settlement patterns that had taken place since the
agency was first tasked with designating metropolitan areas in the 1940s (Frey et al.,
2004). The new system introduced the concept of core based statistical areas (CBSAs)
and categorized these areas as “metropolitan” or “micropolitan.” In 2003, OMB issued
its first listing of areas defined under the new classification system and advised federal
agencies to employ the more recent statistical definitions when conducting research and
implementing policy. CMS adopted these new definitions for use in assigning county
benchmark amounts beginning in March 2004 (Table 1.1, Figure A.3).
The conversion to the new classification system significantly altered the composition
of metropolitan areas designated by OMB. For the majority of counties that were part
of MSAs under the old classification system, the conversion to the new classification
system had no effect on urban floor status; these counties did not shift across the 250,000-
population threshold (Table 1.2, Figure 1.1). However, 72 counties that were part of
MSAs with populations above 250,000 became part of CBSAs with populations below
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this threshold. These counties were grandfathered into urban floor status. As a result,
plans operating in these counties continued to be subject to the higher floor amount in
March 2004. Had CMS introduced the urban floor in March 2004 instead of March 2001,
plans operating in these counties would not have been subject to the higher floor amount.
1.4.3 Counties of Analysis
I focus the analysis in this study on Medicare beneficiaries who reside in two types of
counties: “never urban” counties and “reclassified” counties (Table 1.2). Both never ur-
ban and reclassified counties were part of MSAs under the old metropolitan classification
system, and these counties became part of CBSAs with populations below 250,000 under
the new metropolitan classification system. However, under the old classification system,
never urban counties were part of MSAs with populations below this threshold, while
reclassified counties were part of MSAs with populations above this threshold. Although
never urban and reclassified counties are part of CBSAs with similar populations, reclas-
sified counties were grandfathered into urban floor status. As a result, plans operating in
reclassified counties continued to be subject to a higher payment floor than their never
urban counterparts.
Table 1.3 presents examples of never urban and reclassified counties. Webster Parish,
Louisiana is an example of a reclassified county. In 1999, Webster Parish was part of the
Shreveport-Bossier City MSA. Because the Shreveport-Bossier City MSA had a popula-
tion of 377,673 under the old metropolitan classification system, MA plans operating in
Webster Parish were subject to the higher urban floor benchmark amount of $525 begin-
ning in March 2001. Under the new metropolitan classification system, Webster Parish
became part of the Minden, Louisiana micropolitan statistical area. Although the Minden,
Louisiana micropolitan statistical area had a population of 41,814 in March 2004, well be-
low the 250,000-population threshold, Webster Parish was grandfathered into urban floor
status. Auglaize, Ohio is an example of a never urban county. In 1999, Auglaize was part
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of the Lima MSA, with a corresponding population of 154,065. In 2003, Auglaize became
part of the Wapakoneta micropolitan statistical area, with a corresponding population of
46,230. Although Webster Parish and Auglaize were part of micropolitan statistical areas
with similar populations in March 2004, plans operating in Webster Parish were subject
to the higher urban floor amount while plans operating in Auglaize were subject to the
lower floor amount.
Table 1.4 presents summary statistics for the full cohort of Medicare beneficiaries, as
well as the sample of beneficiaries in never urban and reclassified counties. Never urban
and reclassified counties differ from the full cohort of counties in several observable ways:
these counties have a higher percentage of white beneficiaries, smaller populations, lower
household incomes, lower 2004 FFS spending levels, and, by design, are part of CBSAs
with smaller populations. Beneficiaries in never urban and reclassified counties are also
more likely to reside in the Midwest and the South.
Never urban and reclassified counties are similar in many respects and where there
are significant differences there is no clear pattern. Relative to never urban counties,
reclassified counties have a higher percentage of white beneficiaries, lower poverty rates,
and are more likely to be located within a state with any PDMP law in effect during the
sample years. Reclassified counties also have higher corresponding benchmark amounts;
this $52 difference is expected, given the difference in payment floors across never urban
and reclassified counties. The higher benchmark amounts that correspond to reclassified
counties are associated with higher rates of MA, MA-PDP, and Part D enrollment.
Table 1.5 presents summary statistics for the subsample of Medicare beneficiaries
with Part D coverage. Conditional on having Part D coverage, benchmark amounts
corresponding to reclassified counties remain higher, on average, than benchmark amounts
corresponding to never urban counties. Higher benchmark amounts again coincide with
higher rates of MA and MA-PDP enrollment in reclassified counties.
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1.4.4 Excess Payments to MA Plans Instrument
I exploit differences in benchmark amounts across never urban and reclassified counties
to develop an instrument for MA-PDP enrollment. The benchmark amount is determined
by county average FFS spending levels and payment floors; the benchmark amount is set
at the payment floor for counties with average FFS spending levels below the floor amount,
and at the average FFS spending level for counties with average FFS spending above the
floor amount. Figure 1.2 presents the relationship between average FFS spending levels
and payment floors across never urban and reclassified counties in March 2004. The
benchmark amount for counties with average FFS spending above the higher floor is set
at the level of average FFS spending for both never urban and reclassified counties. The
benchmark amount for counties with average FFS spending between the two payment
floors varies across never urban and reclassified counties: the benchmark amount is set
at the level of average FFS spending for never urban counties, and at the higher (urban)
floor amount for reclassified counties. The benchmark amount for counties with average
FFS spending below the lower floor amount is set at the lower floor amount for never
urban counties, and at the higher floor amount for reclassified counties.
I construct a measure of “excess payments” to plans that operate in reclassified coun-
ties. This measure captures the difference in benchmark payments to plans that operate
in never urban and reclassified counties with the same levels of average FFS spending.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the variation in this measure. For counties with average FFS spend-
ing levels above the higher payment floor, the difference in benchmark amounts across
never urban and reclassified counties is $0. For counties with average FFS spending levels
between the two payment floors, the difference in benchmark amounts between never ur-
ban and reclassified counties is the difference between the higher floor amount and average
FFS spending. For example, a plan operating in a reclassified county with average FFS
spending of $600 will receive an excess payment of $13.89 relative to a plan operating
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in a never urban county with the same level of average FFS spending ($613.89 − $600).
For counties with average FFS spending below the lower floor amount, the difference in
benchmark payments across never urban and reclassified counties is fixed at the difference
between the two payment floors ($58.47).
The excess payments measure effectively designates never urban counties as the coun-
terfactual for what would have occurred in reclassified counties in the absence of the
urban floor. The higher payments to MA plans that operate in reclassified counties are
driven by the intersection of two policy changes – the urban floor and the reclassification
of metropolitan America – and do not reflect underlying differences in beneficiary health
status across never urban and reclassified counties. I harness variation in the excess pay-
ment measure to instrument for MA-PDP enrollment. The per-enrollee payments that
plans receive from the federal government are expected to cover the costs of beneficiary
care. Excess payments increase the likelihood that plans will generate a profit on a given
enrollee and motivate plans to enroll a greater number of beneficiaries. Figure 1.4 illus-
trates the positive correlation between excess payments to MA plans and MA penetration
rates.
My identification strategy hinges on the assumption that residence in a reclassified
county is uncorrelated with opioid use, except through its effect on MA-PDP enrollment.
One concern is that designation as a reclassified county in 2004 was the result of changing
economic or population patterns. For example, reclassified counties could have become
economically detached from larger metropolitan areas in ways that are correlated with
opioid use. The history and implementation of OMBs new metropolitan classification
system suggest that this is not the case. First, the core-based approach relied on method-
ology and population estimates from the year 2000, one year prior to the introduction of
the urban floor. Second, counties that went from being part of more populated MSAs
under the old classification system to being part of smaller CBSAs under the new classi-
fication system did so because of “a more stringent commuting threshold” requirement,
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rather than changing demographic or socioeconomic patterns (Frey et al., 2004). Third,
the introduction of the new metropolitan standards followed a decade-long effort by OMB;
reclassified counties were likely comparable to their never urban counterparts well-before
the 2000 issuance of the new standards and the 2003 release.
Previous studies have employed a regression discontinuity (RD) analysis that exploits
the 250,000 population threshold to identify the causal effect of MA and MA-PDP en-
rollment on the use of health care services and health outcomes (Afendulis et al., 2017;
Baker et al., 2020). Although conceptually similar, my instrumental variables strategy,
which is identified entirely by non-urban counties, offers a potential advantage over the
RD approach. The discontinuity analysis relies heavily on functional form and band-
width assumptions about the running variable – CBSA population. The IV approach
that I propose does not require these assumptions; by design, never urban and reclas-
sified counties are part of CBSAs with similar populations, and treatment status is not
determined by this field. Furthermore, my results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the
CBSA population field in the analysis.
1.4.5 Methods
To determine the impact of MA-PDP enrollment on opioid use, I begin by estimating
the following specification across the sample of beneficiaries in never urban and reclassified
counties:
Yic(s,r)t = β0 + β1MAPDit + β2Xit + β3Vct + β4Zst + θr + γt + ic(s,r)t (1.4)
Yic(s,r)t represents measures of opioid use for enrollee i residing in county c (in state s
and region r) in year t. In addition to any opioid use, I examine the impact of MA-
PDP enrollment on intensity of use. I estimate the logarithmic transformation of annual
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daily MED use and maximum daily MED use; Box-Cox tests favor the log specifications
over the linear specifications, with a parameter estimate of 0.14 corresponding to annual
daily MED use and an estimate of 0.05 corresponding to maximum daily MED use.
MAPDit is an indicator for whether beneficiary i is enrolled in an MA-PDP in year
t. β1 is the coefficient of interest and captures the average treatment effect (ATE) of
enrollment in an MA-PDP relative to enrollment in an SA-PDP. The terms Xit, Vct, and
Zst represent vectors of covariates that may be correlated with MA-PDP enrollment and
opioid use. The term Xit represents a vector of time-varying and time-invariant individual
characteristics, including age, gender, and race. The term Vct represents a vector of time-
varying and time-invariant county characteristics, including disability rate, poverty rate,
unemployment rate, local health care market characteristics, 2004 average FFS spending
levels, and the corresponding CBSA population. The term Zst controls for a vector of
time-varying state covariates, including any PDMP law in effect and a must access PDMP
law in effect. The specification includes region fixed effects that capture time-invariant
regional characteristics (θr) and year fixed-effects that control for year-specific shocks (γt).
Standard errors are clustered at the county-level. I estimate all models via ordinary least
squares (OLS).
Given the long history of favorable selection into MA plans, enrollment in an MA-
PDP may be correlated with unobserved beneficiary health status. As a result, β1 from
Equation 1.4 will capture both the effect of MA-PDP enrollment on opioid use, as well as
differences in underlying health status across MA-PDP and SA-PDP enrollees. I estimate
the following instrumental variables specifications to isolate the causal effect of MA-PDP
enrollment on measures of opioid use:
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MAPDic(s,r)t = α0 + α1ExcessPaymentsc,2004 + α2Xit + α3Vct
+ α4Zst + θr + γt + ic(s,r)t (1.5)
Yic(s,r)t = β0 + β1M̂APDit + β2Xit + β3Vct + β4Zst + θr + γt + ic(s,r)t (1.6)
The first-stage equation models the relationship between MA-PDP enrollment and 2004
excess benchmark payments to MA plans. α1 represents the impact of a $1 increase in
excess benchmark payments to MA plans on the probability of MA-PDP enrollment. I
use excess payments from 2004 for two reasons. First, the urban floor may have affected
average FFS spending levels in later years. Second, after 2004 payment floors were no
longer in effect; however, benchmark amounts after 2004 were adjusted according to the
March 2004 levels (Figures A.3, A.4, and A.5). This meant that floor counties effectively
maintained floor status if their average FFS spending levels remained below the growth-
adjusted 2004 floor amounts.
Equation 1.6 models the relationship between measures of opioid use and the predicted
probability of enrollment in an MA-PDP from Equation 1.4. β1 is the coefficient of
interest, and captures the local average treatment effect (LATE) of enrollment in an
MA-PDP on measures of opioid use among beneficiaries who enroll in an MA-PDP as
a result of excess benchmark payments to MA plans in their counties of residence. I




1.5.1 First Stage: The Effect of Excess Payments to MA Plans on MA-PDP
Enrollment
I begin by examining the strength of excess benchmark payments to MA plans in
predicting MA-PDP enrollment. In Table 1.6, I present estimates of α1 from Equation 1.5
and corresponding F-statistics from models that gradually include additional covariates.
Excess payments to MA plans are a strong predictor of enrollment in an MA-PDP. In
the most parsimonious model that excludes all other covariates, a $10 increase in excess
payments to MA plans is associated with a 2.6 percentage point increase in the probability
of enrollment in an MA-PDP. The corresponding F-statistic of 27.04 indicates that there
is no weak instruments problem. Estimates of α1 and F-statistics are generally stable in
magnitude and precision across models that include additional covariates.
I also examine the strength of excess payments to MA plans in predicting MA-PDP
enrollment among the subset of beneficiaries with Part D coverage. Because I observe
prescription opioid use through the Part D program only, estimates pertaining to the
sample of Part D enrollees constitute the true first-stage effect. The estimate from the
most parsimonious model indicates that a $10 increase in excess payments is associated
with a 3.6 percentage point increase in the probability of enrollment in an MA-PDP among
beneficiaries with Part D coverage. The F-statistic of 36.39 exceeds the corresponding F-
statistic from the sample of all beneficiaries (27.04). The inclusion of additional covariates
again has minimal impact on the magnitude and the precision of the estimates.
I next examine the strength of excess payments to MA plans in predicting additional
coverage outcomes, including enrollment in an MA plan and Part D enrollment (Table
1.7). Not surprisingly, estimates of α1 are similar in magnitude across models in which
MA enrollment and MA-PDP enrollment are outcomes. Excess payments to MA plans
also predict Part D enrollment, which includes enrollment in either an MA-PDP or an
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SA-PDP; a $10 increase in excess payments is associated with a 0.84 percentage point
increase in the probability of having Part D coverage. This indicates that excess payments
to MA plans increase the likelihood that two types of beneficiaries enroll in an MA-PDP:
beneficiaries who would have enrolled in an SA-PDP, and beneficiaries who would not
have had Part D coverage.
While I observe opioid use among beneficiaries who gain Part D coverage because of
excess payments to MA plans, I do not observe opioid use among beneficiaries without
Part D coverage who would have enrolled in an MA-PDP had they resided in counties
with excess payments to MA plans. Previous research finds that Medicare beneficiaries
who forego Part D coverage have low expected prescription drug expenditures (Levy and
Weir, 2009). If beneficiaries who gain Part D coverage have low prescription drug use,
estimates of β1 may overstate the effect of MA-PDP enrollment on reducing measures of
opioid use.
I test the sensitivity of my results to Part D selection by examining the impact of MA-
PDP enrollment on measures of opioid use across two additional populations of Medicare
beneficiaries. First, I compare estimates pertaining to the sample of all Part D enrollees
against estimates pertaining to the sample of beneficiaries with chronic conditions, in-
cluding diabetes, high cholesterol, and high blood pressure. I assume that beneficiaries
with chronic conditions are unlikely to forego Part D coverage because they have expected
prescription drug expenditures; as a result, excess payments to MA plans will not predict
Part D enrollment among these beneficiaries. I flag prescription fills for antidiabetic med-
ications, beta blockers, and statins in the Part D utilization data to identify beneficiaries
with chronic conditions. Second, I examine the impact of MA-PDP enrollment on opi-
oid use across all Medicare beneficiaries by imputing zero opioid use among beneficiaries
without Part D coverage. While it is implausible to assume that all beneficiaries without
Part D coverage do not use prescription opioids, these estimates provide a lower bound
on the extent to which MA-PDP enrollment reduces opioid use.
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1.5.2 The Impact of MA-PDP Enrollment on Any Opioid Use
In Table 1.8, I present OLS and IV estimates of β1 from models that examine the
impact of MA-PDP enrollment on the probability of any opioid use. I present estimates
pertaining to the sample of all Part D enrollees, estimates pertaining to the subsample of
Part D enrollees with a chronic condition, and estimates pertaining to the sample of all
Medicare beneficiaries. Column 1 contains the mean rate of opioid use among beneficiaries
in never urban and reclassified counties; column 2 contains the OLS estimate of β1 from
Equation 1.4; column 3 contains the IV estimate of β1 from Equation 1.6; and, column
4 contains the p-value from a robust test of exogeneity, where the null hypothesis is that
MA-PDP enrollment is exogenous to beneficiary opioid use (Wooldridge, 1995).
The estimates pertaining to the sample of all Part D enrollees indicate that MA-PDP
enrollment lowers the probability of any opioid use. The OLS and the IV estimates are
similar in magnitude, and I fail to reject the null hypothesis that MA-PDP enrollment is
exogenous. The OLS estimate indicates that, on average, MA-PDP enrollment lowers the
probability of opioid use by 2.6 percentage points; this constitutes an 8.4 percent decline
from the mean rate of 31 percent. This effect is significantly lower than the 37 percent
reduction documented by Baker et al. (2020).
The estimates pertaining to the subsample of Part D enrollees with a chronic condition
also indicate that MA-PDP enrollment reduces the probability of opioid use. However,
these estimates are smaller in both magnitude and percentage terms than the estimates
pertaining to the sample of all Part D enrollees. The OLS estimate indicates that en-
rollment in an MA-PDP reduces the probability of opioid use by 2.1 percentage points
among beneficiaries with chronic conditions; this constitutes a 6.1 percent reduction from
the mean rate of 34 percent. The IV estimate is smaller in magnitude than the OLS
estimate and imprecise. I again fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
Among the sample of all Medicare beneficiaries, MA-PDP enrollment increases the
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probability of opioid use. The OLS estimate indicates that MA-PDP enrollment increases
the probability of opioid use by 9.9 percentage points; this represents a 49 percent increase
from the mean rate of opioid use (20.2 percent). The IV estimate is similar in magnitude to
the OLS estimate and precisely estimated, and I again fail to reject the null of exogeneity.
1.5.3 The Impact of MA-PDP Enrollment on Intensity of Use
In Table 1.9, I present OLS and IV estimates of β1 from models in which measures
of intensity of opioid use are outcomes. Columns 1-4 correspond to models in which the
outcome is the natural logarithm of annual daily MED use; columns 5-8 correspond to
models in which the outcome is the natural logarithm of maximum daily MED use; and,
columns 9-12 correspond to models in which the outcome is an indicator for use of an
opioid prescription with a daily MED of 50 or more. I present estimates pertaining to the
sample of all Part D enrollees as well as estimates pertaining to the subsample of Part D
enrollees with a chronic condition.
Among the sample of all Part D enrollees, MA-PDP enrollment lowers both annual
daily MED use and maximum daily MED use. The OLS estimate in column 2 indicates
that MA-PDP enrollment lowers annual daily MED use by 1.6 percent (exp(-0.0157)-
1)*100), and the OLS estimate in column 6 indicates that MA-PDP enrollment lowers
maximum daily MED use by 2.8 percent. While the corresponding IV estimates are both
larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates, the IV estimates are imprecise. I fail to
reject the null hypothesis that MA-PDP enrollment is exogenous in both models.
The OLS estimate in column 10 indicates that MA-PDP enrollment lowers the prob-
ability of using an opioid prescription with a corresponding daily MED of 50 or more by
1.5 percentage points. This represents a 4.9 percent reduction from the overall mean of
31 percent. Although the IV estimate is positive in sign, this estimate is noisy and I am
unable to rule out large effects in either direction. I again fail to reject the null hypothesis
that MA-PDP enrollment is exogenous.
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The OLS and IV estimates pertaining to the subsample of Part D enrollees with
chronic conditions are remarkably similar to the estimates pertaining to the sample of all
Part D enrollees. This finding suggests that the estimates pertaining to the sample of all
Part D enrollees are not biased due to Part D selection.
1.6 Sensitivity Analyses
1.6.1 The Effect of MA-PDP Enrollment on Opioid Use Over Time
Data years 2008 through 2015 represent a period of significant transition in the medical
community’s assessment of safe opioid prescribing practices. During this time, researchers
established many of the dosage thresholds linked to adverse health outcomes that continue
to be recognized today (Dunn et al., 2010; Bohnert et al., 2011). In Figure 1.6, I present
average measures of opioid use throughout the data years for the full sample of Part
D enrollees as well as the sample of Part D enrollees in never urban and reclassified
counties. While beneficiaries in never urban and reclassified counties consistently exhibit
higher levels of opioid use, both groups trend similarly. Notably, both the full sample
of beneficiaries and the sample of beneficiaries in never urban and reclassified counties
exhibit a significant decline in measures of intensity of opioid use between 2010 and 2011.
I examine whether MA-PDP enrollment had a differential effect on opioid use throughout
the sample period.
I first test the strength of excess payments to MA plans in predicting MA-PDP en-
rollment throughout the sample period. In Table A.3, I present estimates of α1 that
correspond to individual data years. The table contains estimates from the sample of all
Part D enrollees, as well as estimates from the sample of Part D enrollees with any opioid
use. I find that excess payments are a strong predictor of MA-PDP enrollment across
both populations of beneficiaries throughout the sample period.
In Table A.4, I present estimates of β1 from models that examine the impact of MA-
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PDP enrollment on the probability of any opioid use throughout the sample period. These
estimates are also presented in panel A of Figure 1.7. The OLS estimates corresponding to
individual data years indicate that enrollment in an MA-PDP is consistently associated
with lower rates of opioid use. The IV estimates are generally similar in magnitude,
although these estimates are imprecise. Across all data years, I fail to reject the null
hypothesis of exogeneity.
In Table A.5, I present estimates of β1 from models that examine the impact of MA-
PDP enrollment on intensity of opioid use over time. These estimates are also presented
in Panels B.-D. of Figure 1.7. While both the OLS and IV estimates generally indicate
that MA-PDP enrollment lowered intensity of opioid use throughout the sample period,
there are several discrepancies. First, the IV estimates pertaining to years 2008 and 2009
are substantially larger in magnitude than the corresponding OLS estimates. I reject the
null hypothesis of exogeneity for five out of six outcomes during these sample years. After
2009, the OLS estimates are negative and generally significant at conventional levels, while
the IV estimates vary in sign and are generally imprecise. The OLS estimates suggest
that MA-PDP enrollment reduced intensity of opioid use early in the sample years (2008
through 2010) and later in the sample years (2013 through 2015).
1.6.2 Instrument Validity
Although I generally fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, this test relies on
the assumption that excess payments to MA plans are a valid instrument for MA-PDP
enrollment. I probe the validity of the instrument by comparing IV estimates from models
that gradually include additional covariates. Table A.6 presents estimates from models
in which the outcome is any opioid use. The IV estimates are somewhat sensitive to
the inclusion of additional covariates; this finding is expected, given the presence of Part
D selection. Tables A.7, A.8, and A.9 present IV estimates from models in which the
outcomes are measures of intensity of opioid use. The inclusion of additional covariates
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in these models has minimal effect on the estimates, especially those pertaining to sample
years 2008 and 2009.
1.7 Propoxyphene Case Study
Managed care plans that contract with the Medicare program have several tools at
their disposal to influence beneficiary opioid use. For example, plans can coordinate with
providers to prescribe safer dosages to plan enrollees. Plans may also avoid contracting
with providers who are more prone to riskier opioid prescribing patterns. Alternatively,
plans may attempt to limit enrollee exposure to high dosage opioids through benefit
design. I am examining these mechanisms in related work. However, in this section I
show one channel through which plans were able to limit enrollee use of high dosage
opioids.
To the extent that MA-PDPs internalize negative externalities from prescription opi-
oids, these plans will have a greater incentive to limit enrollee exposure to drugs that are
more frequently linked to adverse health outcomes. In this section, I examine whether
MA-PDP enrollment reduced the likelihood of propoxyphene use in 2008 and 2009.
First introduced in 1957, propoxyphene was sold under the brand names Darvon and
Darvocet. Propoxyphene was popular among Medicare beneficiaries; in 2008, roughly
one-quarter of Part D enrollees with any opioid use filled a prescription for propoxyphene
(Figure 1.8 panel A). Despite the drug’s popularity, the medical community was largely in
agreement that the risks associated with propoxyphene use far outweighed any potential
benefits; propoxyphene was found to be ineffective in addressing pain and its use was
accompanied by substantial heart risks and a high risk of overdose (Wilson, 2010). In
November 2010, following a 32-year petition, the FDA removed propoxyphene from the
market. The withdrawal of propoxyphene had a significant impact on reducing intensity
of opioid use among Medicare beneficiaries (Figure 1.8 panels B.-D.). In 2008 and 2009,
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over 60 percent of propoxyphene users had a prescription for 50 daily MED or more; after
2010, this figure declined to less than 30 percent.
In Table 1.10, I present OLS and IV estimates of the impact of MA-PDP enrollment on
the probability of propoxyphene use, as well as intensity of opioid use in 2008 and 2009. I
examine the impact of MA-PDP enrollment on two populations of Medicare beneficiaries:
opioid users and opioid users who did not use propoxyphene. Among opioid users, MA-
PDP enrollment reduced the probability of propoxyphene use by 19 percentage points, a
76 percent reduction from the mean rate (25 percent). Enrollment in an MA-PDP also
lowered intensity of opioid used during this period. Conditional on any propoxyphene use,
enrollment in an MA-PDP lowered the probability of using a prescription with a daily
MED of 50 or more by 14 percentage points, a 32 percent reduction from the overall rate
(43 percent). Among opioid users who did not use propoxyphene, MA-PDP enrollment
had a lesser effect on intensity of use.
1.8 Discussion
This study adds to a growing literature that examines the interaction between private
health insurer incentives and externalities from prescription drugs. I exploit the unique
institutional design of the Medicare Part D program to test the hypothesis that integrated
MA-PDPs internalize negative externalities from prescription opioids. I find evidence that
supports this hypothesis; relative to enrollment in a stand-alone drug plan, enrollment
in an integrated MA-PDP lowered the probability of high dosage opioid use during the
years 2008 and 2009. This effect was primarily the result of MA-PDP enrollment reducing
the probability of propoxyphene use, a high dosage opioid that was withdrawn from the
market in 2010.
The findings from this study differ from recent work by Baker et al. (2020). They find
that MA-PDP enrollment reduces the probability of any opioid use; however, they find no
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evidence of an effect of MA-PDP enrollment on intensity of opioid use. There are several
reasons why our results may differ. First, I test for differences in measures of opioid use
across beneficiaries who reside in counties that are part of smaller metropolitan areas.
Their results are specific to beneficiaries who reside in counties that are part of larger
metropolitan areas with a population of 250,000. The impact of MA-PDP enrollment on
opioid use may vary across metropolitan areas with different populations.
Second, while their study focuses on beneficiary opioid use from 2014, my analysis
spans 2008 through 2015. The years 2008 through 2015 represent a period of significant
transition in the medical community’s assessment of safe opioid prescribing guidelines. I
find that the effect of MA-PDP enrollment on lowering measures of intensity of opioid use
is most pronounced in 2008 and 2009, prior to the start of their sample period.
Third, while both of our studies find that MA-PDP enrollment lowers the probability
of any opioid use, I document a substantially smaller effect (8 percent versus 27 percent).
I find that higher benchmark payments to MA plans increase the likelihood of Part D
enrollment. In sensitivity analysis, I find evidence that beneficiaries who gain Part D
coverage are less likely to use opioids. This finding aligns with previous research docu-
menting low expected drug costs among Medicare beneficiaries without Part D coverage
(Levy and Weir, 2009). While the identification strategy that I employ differs from that
used in Baker et al. (2020), both of our approaches rely on variation in benchmark pay-
ments to MA plans. Their finding that MA-PDP enrollment reduces the probability of
opioid use may be sensitive to Part D selection.
Although I find evidence that MA-PDP enrollment lowered the probability of high
dosage opioid use in 2008 and 2009, I am unable to identify how plans achieved this
outcome. I am investigating this mechanism in related work. However, the finding that
enrollment in an MA-PDP reduced the probability of propoxyphene use suggests that
plans focused on restricting specific drugs, rather than dosages across all opioid drugs.
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1.9 Conclusion
Although the Medicare program is publicly financed, private health insurers play an
increasingly prominent role in the administration of Medicare benefits. Understanding
how these firms’ incentives interact with beneficiary welfare is of first order concern.
This issue is particularly salient as the population of Medicare beneficiaries is expected
to increase substantially in upcoming years. I find evidence that aligning these firms’
incentives with enrollee health outcomes affects the administration of benefits.
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Figure 1.5: Map of Never Urban and Reclassified Counties
Never Urban Reclassified
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D. Any Daily MED ≥ 50
Note: Panels B.-D. are conditional on any opioid use.
Sources: Sources: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries and Part D Event Files.
Full Sample Never Urban and Reclassified Counties
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OLS estimates are estimates of β1 from Equation 1.4 (and 95% CIs). IV estimates are estimates of β1 from Equation 1.6 (and 95% CIs).
Standard errors are clustered at the county-level.
Sources: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries and Part D Event Files.
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
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Note: All panels are conditional on any opioid fill.
Sources: Sources: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries and Part D Event Files.
All Opioid Users Ever-Filled Propoxyphene Users
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Table 1.1: Statistical Area Classification Files and County Benchmark Payment Floors
Year Classification File Population Estimate Lower Floor Higher “Urban” Floor
1998 −− −− $367 −−
1999 −− −− $379.84 −−
2000 −− −− $401.61 −−
2001 (Jan-Feb) −− −− $415.01 −−
2001 (Mar-Dec) June 30, 1999 July 1, 1999 $475 $525
2002 June 30, 1999 July 1, 1999 $500.37 $553.04
2003 June 30, 1999 April 1, 2000 $495.39 $547.54
2004 (Jan-Feb) June 30, 1999 April 1, 2000 $535.88 $592.29
2004 (Mar-Dec) December 1, 2003 April 1, 2000 $555.42 $613.89
Notes: The table lists the statistical area and population files used to identify counties subject to
payment floors, as well as the corresponding floor amounts. The June 30, 1999 classification file refers
to the last file issued under the old metropolitan classification system. The December 1, 2003 file refers
to the first file issued under the new metropolitan classification system.
Sources: Census Historical Delineation Files, Census Population Estimates, and CMS Ratebook Data.
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Table 1.2: County Floor Status and the New Metropolitan Classification System
2004 MSA Pop 2000 Pop 2010 Pop
2001 2004 Counties Name (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) 2004 FFS Rate
Non-Urban Non-Urban 179 Never Urban 148.08 99.74 109.41 $539.51
[44.89] [54.32] [62.30] [$82.39]
Urban Non-Urban 72 Reclassified 129.95 104.38 114.32 $564.56
[65.34] [56.48] [62.99] [$82.49]
−− Non-Urban 784 −− 68.24 40.26 43.09 $525.91
[46.99] [28.19] [32.31] [$80.84]
Urban Urban 582 −− 2,574.46 342.97 380.23 $597.71
[3,733.96] [614.28] [651.34] [$94.86]
Non-Urban Urban 16 −− 324.04 109.95 121.08 $501.89
[94.104] [79.42] [86.74] [$58.18]
−− Urban 146 −− 1,340.59 25.08 27.49 $539.75
[1,470.49] [16.79] [18.69] [$74.67]
Notes: Counties are grouped based on their status under the old (2001) and new (2004) metropolitan classification
systems. Non-urban refers to counties that were part of MSAs with populations below 250,000 under the old
classification system, or part of CBSAs with populations below 250,000 under the new classification system. Urban
refers to counties that were part of MSAs with populations above 250,000 under the old classification system, or
part of CBSAs with populations above 250,000 under the new classification system. 2004 FFS Rate refers to the
average 2004 fee-for-service spending level used to determine county floor status. The table presents means and
standard deviations (brackets).
Sources: Census Historical Delineation Files, Census Population Estimates, and CMS Ratebook Data.
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Table 1.3: Examples of Never Urban and Reclassified Counties
1999 MSA Classification 2003 CBSA Classification
County County Type Name Type Pop Name Type Pop
Auglaize, OH Never Urban Lima, OH MSA 154,065 Wapakoneta, OH Micro 46,230
Dale, AL Never Urban Dothan, AL MSA 135,243 Enterprise-Ozark, AL Micro 92,759
Ector, TX Never Urban Odessa-Midland, TX MSA 242,238 Odessa, TX Metro 121,124
Jones, GA Reclassified Macon, GA MSA 321,586 Macon, GA Metro 222,479
Kankakee, IL Reclassified Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI CMSA* 8,885,919 Kankakee-Bradley, IL Metro 103,825
Webster, LA Reclassified Shreveport-Bossier City, LA MSA 377,673 Minden, LA Micro 41,814
Notes: Under the old metropolitan classification system, MSA denotes Metropolitan Statistical Area and CMSA denotes Consolidated
Metropolitan Statistical Area. Under the new metropolitan classification system, Metro denotes Metropolitan Statistical Area and
Micro denotes Micropolitan Statistical Area.
*CMSAs were comprised of Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs). Kankakee, IL was associated with the Kankakee, IL PMSA
with a corresponding population of 102,720. However, benchmark floor amounts were assigned based on MSA or CMSA population.
Sources: Census Historical Delineation Files, Census Population Estimates, and CMS Ratebook Data.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics Across the Cohort of Medicare Beneficiaries
Full Sample Never Urban and Reclassified Counties
All All Never Urban Reclassified Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual Characteristics
Age 74.82 74.69 74.78 74.52 -0.26
Female (%) 57.01% 56.62% 56.78% 56.26% -0.52
White (%) 86.71% 92.26% 91.89% 93.09% 1.19
Black (%) 5.59% 3.58% 3.63% 3.46% -0.17
Other Race (%) 7.69% 4.16% 4.47% 3.45% -1.03
County Characteristics
Population (1000s) 918.06 145.61 144.66 147.80 3.15
Disabled - All (%) 12.59% 13.91% 13.79% 14.16% 0.37
Disabled - Elderly (%) 36.28% 37.37% 37.64% 36.78% -0.86
Poverty (%) 14.83% 16.03% 16.54% 14.87% -1.67
Household Income ($1000s) 53.68 47.28 46.48 49.13 2.65
Unemployment Rate (%) 7.45% 7.40% 7.16% 7.96% 0.80
Land Area Per Capita 1.25 1.02 0.95 1.17 0.23
Physicians per 1000 people 0.75 0.72 0.77 0.61 -0.16
Hospitals per 1000 people 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.021 -0.005
Beds per 1000 people 3.08 3.73 4.09 2.89 -1.21
2004 Average FFS ($s) 604.89 554.89 550.45 565.01 14.56
In CBSA (%) 91.84% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00
2003 CBSA Pop (1000s) 3,060.05 153.46 156.94 145.49 -11.44
State Characteristics
PDMP - Any (%) 21.99% 22.15% 20.83% 25.17% 4.33
PDMP - Must Access (%) 9.82% 9.86% 9.65% 10.34% 0.69
Region of Residence
Midwest (%) 23.15% 30.08% 29.34% 31.76% 2.42
Northeast (%) 18.17% 11.78% 10.86% 13.88% 3.02
South (%) 36.39% 39.57% 40.91% 36.53% -4.38
West (%) 22.29% 18.57% 18.89% 17.83% -1.06
Benchmark Amounts and Coverage
Benchmark Amount ($s) 844.03 796.75 780.89 832.98 52.09
MA Enrollment (%) 31.57% 23.06% 19.97% 30.11% 10.14
MA-PDP Enrollment (%) 27.18% 17.23% 14.28% 23.97% 9.69
Part D Enrollment (%) 69.79% 64.99% 64.24% 66.71% 2.47
Counties 3,123 250 178 72
Observations 35,404,744 3,464,563 2,409,236 1,055,327
Note: Table contains sample means.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics for Medicare Beneficiaries with Part D Coverage
Full Sample Never Urban and Reclassified Counties
All All Never Urban Reclassified Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benchmark Amounts and Coverage
Benchmark Amount ($s) 847.79 797.33 781.27 832.62 51.35
MA Enrollment (%) 43.15% 32.48% 28.12% 42.07% 13.96
MA-PDP Enrollment (%) 38.94% 26.51% 22.23% 35.94% 13.71
Part D Enrollment (%) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0
Measures of Opioid Use
Any Opioid Fill (%) 29.36% 31.01% 31.10% 30.82% -0.28
Conditional on Any Opioid Fill
Annual Daily MED 34.71 34.93 35.09 34.58 -0.51
Max Daily MED 43.89 44.29 44.45 43.94 -0.51
Any Daily MED ≥ 50 (%) 30.55% 31.24% 31.43% 30.83% -0.60
Counties 3,122 250 178 72
Observations 24,709,626 2,251,773 1,547,762 704,011
Note: Table contains sample means.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table 1.6: The Effect of Excess Payments to MA Plans on MA-PDP Enrollment
MA-PDP Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Beneficiaries
Excess Payments 0.00263*** 0.00253*** 0.00253*** 0.00266*** 0.00265***
(N = 3,464,563) (0.00051) (0.00052) (0.00052) (0.00048) (0.00047)
F-Statistic 27.04 33.03 27.25 20.02 21.65
Part D Beneficiaries
Excess Payments 0.00362*** 0.00358*** 0.00357*** 0.003617*** 0.00362***
(N = 2,251,773) (0.00059) (0.00062) (0.00062) (0.000603) (0.00059)
F-Statistic 36.39 33.15 42.97 32.29 34.63
Census Region and Year FEs X X X X
Individual Characteristics X X X
County Characteristics X X
State Characteristics X
Notes: Estimates corresponds to α1 from Equation 1.5. Standard errors are clustered at the county-
level. *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** denotes significance at the five-percent level;
* denotes significance at the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table 1.7: The Effect of Excess Payments to MA Plans on MA-PDP Enrollment, MA Enrollment, and Part D Coverage
MA-PDP Enrollment MA Enrollment Part D Enrollment
(1) (2) (3)
All Beneficiaries
Excess Payments 0.00265*** 0.00273*** 0.00084***
(N = 3,464,563) (0.00047) (0.00046) (0.00032)
Part D Beneficiaries
Excess Payments 0.00362*** 0.00349*** –
(N = 2,251,773) (0.00059) (0.00056)
Notes: Estimates corresponds to α1 from Equation 1.5. Standard errors are clustered at the county-
level. *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** denotes significance at the five-percent level; *
denotes significance at the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table 1.8: The Impact of MA-PDP Enrollment on Any Opioid Use
Any Opioid Use
OLS IV Exog
Mean Estimate Estimate (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Part D 0.3101 -0.0258*** -0.0262 0.9813
(N = 2,251,773) (0.0018) (0.0201)
Part D: Chronic Conditions 0.3367 -0.0205*** -0.014 0.7611
(N = 1,485,171) (0.0019) (0.023)
All Beneficiaries 0.2016 0.0993*** 0.084*** 0.6259
(N = 3,464,563) (0.0034) (0.032)
Notes: Column 1 contains outcome averages. Column 2 contains OLS estimates
of β1 from Equation 1.4. Column 3 contains 2SLS estimates of β1 from Equation
1.6. Column 4 contains p-values from a robust test of exogeneity (Wooldridge 1995).
Standard errors are clustered at the county-level. *** denotes significance at the one-
percent level; ** denotes significance at the five-percent level; * denotes significance
at the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table 1.9: The Impact of MA-PDP Enrollment on Intensity of Opioid Use
ln(Annual Daily MED) ln(Max Daily MED) Any Daily MED ≥ 50
OLS IV Exog OLS IV Exog OLS IV Exog
Meana Estimate Estimate (p-value) Meana Estimate Estimate (p-value) Mean Estimate Estimate (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Part D 34.93 -0.0157*** -0.060 0.3389 44.29 -0.0289*** -0.049 0.6490 0.3124 -0.0154*** 0.010 0.4439
(N = 698,382) (0.0046) (0.049) (0.0049) (0.048) (0.0034) (0.035)
Chronic Conditions 34.41 -0.0159*** -0.0568 0.3947 43.78 -0.0285*** -0.048 0.6889 0.3071 -0.0152*** 0.010 0.4540
(N = 499,989) (0.0047) (0.0505) (0.0051) (0.049) (0.0035) (0.036)
Notes: Columns 1, 5, and 9 contain outcome averages. Columns 2, 6, and 10 contain OLS estimates of β1 from Equation 1.4. Columns 3, 7, and 11 contain 2SLS estimates
of β1 from Equation 1.6. Columns 4, 8, and 12 contain p-values from a robust test of exogeneity (Wooldridge 1995). Standard errors are clustered at the county-level. ***
denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** denotes significance at the five-percent level; * denotes significance at the ten-percent level.
aAverages are not log transformed.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table 1.10: The Impact of MA-PDP Enrollment on Propoxyphene Use and Intensity of
Opioid Use (2008 and 2009)
OLS IV Exog
Mean Estimate Estimate (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Any Propoxyphene Use
All Opioid Users 0.2478 -0.031*** -0.189** 0.0280
(N = 123,503) (0.0087) (0.079)
Non-Propoxy Users 0 – – –
(N = 92,899)
B. Any Daily MED ≥ 50
All Opioid Users 0.4289 -0.0319*** -0.139** 0.0864
(N = 123,503) (0.0075) (0.062)
Non-Propoxy Users 0.2953 -0.0178** -0.018 0.9985
(N = 92,899) (0.0076) (0.062)
Notes: Columns 1 contains outcome averages. Column 2 contains OLS
estimates of β1 from Equation 1.4. Column 3 contains 2SLS estimates of β1
from Equation 1.6. Column 4 contains p-values from a robust test of exogeneity
(Wooldridge 1995). Standard errors are clustered at the county-level. ***
denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** denotes significance at the
five-percent level; * denotes significance at the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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CHAPTER II
Insurer Incentives and Benefit Design for Opioids
2.1 Introduction
In 2018, over 67 thousand Americans died from a drug overdose (Hedegaard et al.,
2020). Although the substantial rise in drug-related mortalities over the past decade has
been largely driven by illicit opioid use, the origins of this epidemic are rooted in opioid
prescribing patterns that began in the 1990s and persisted throughout the 2000s. While
pharmaceutical companies, physicians, and patients have received increased scrutiny in
recent years over their respective roles in the ongoing crisis, the actions and behaviors
of private health insurers have gone largely overlooked. These firms play an integral
role in coordinating care between large segments of the U.S. population and health care
providers; as a result, health insurers are uniquely positioned to monitor and observe
patterns of opioid prescribing and use. Furthermore, despite recent efforts at the federal
level to address the opioid epidemic, many public health advocates contend that the
most impactful change will occur through communal ventures. Because of their influence
in local health care markets, developing a better understanding of how private health
insurers’ incentives interact with enrollee opioid use is of first order concern.
In this study, I examine how the breadth of coverage that private health insurers
provide interacts with benefit design for prescription opioids. I study this issue within
50
the context of the Medicare Part D program, which features two types of private health
insurance plans: stand-alone Part D Plans (SA-PDPs) and Medicare Advantage Part D
Plans (MA-PDPs). While SA-PDPs provide coverage for prescription drugs only, MA-
PDPs provide coverage for both drug and non-drug medical expenditures. Because of
the breadth of coverage that they provide, MA-PDPs have an incentive to consider how
enrollees’ opioid use interacts with other modes of treatment, such as hospital care. SA-
PDPs face no such incentive. I examine whether these differences in incentives manifest
through differences in benefit design for opioids.
To conduct my analysis, I leverage evidence on the link between opioid use and ad-
verse health events that can lead to hospitalizations. While prescription opioids have a
negative connotation surrounding them, these drugs continue to serve as a primary form
of treatment for both chronic and acute pain. This issue is particularly salient in the
context of the Medicare Part D program; the elderly face higher rates of chronic pain
stemming from conditions that become more common later in life, such as arthritis. To
distinguish between therapeutic and hazardous opioid use, I exploit evidence from the
medical literature on the link between high daily dosages of opioids and hospitalizations.
A large body of literature finds that high daily dosages of opioids can lead to a range
of adverse health events, including unintentional overdose, fractures and falls from the
side-effects of these drugs, and, in extreme cases, mortality (Dunn et al., 2010; Saunders
et al., 2010; Bohnert et al., 2011). Because benefit design directly impacts enrollee drug
use, I hypothesize that MA-PDPs structure benefits in a way that limits enrollee use of
high dosage opioids. To examine this issue, I test for differences in benefit design for
opioids across MA-PDPs and SA-PDPs.
I use Part D benefit design data that spans various years throughout 2008 and 2015 to
examine my research question. I focus on benefit design outcomes that are based on uti-
lization management rules; these include prior authorization requirements and quantity
limit restrictions. I find evidence that MA-PDPs design benefits to limit high dosage opi-
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oid use; relative to opioids covered by SA-PDPs, opioids covered by MA-PDPs are more
likely to have a quantity limit restriction. Conditional on a quantity limit restriction, opi-
oids covered by MA-PDPs have lower daily dosage allowances relative to opioids covered
by SA-PDPs. These effects are primarily driven by differences in benefit design from early
in the sample period, when utilization management rules were less frequently imposed.
In addition, I find that MA-PDPs were less likely to provide coverage for propoxyphene,
a high dosage opioid that was withdrawn from the market in 2010.
This study adds to two strands of literature. The first examines the effect of enrollment
in an MA-PDP on opioid use (Baker et al., 2020; Rhodes, 2020). Although these studies
find that enrollment in an MA-PDP lowers measures of opioid use, they do not provide
direct evidence on how this occurs. My results suggest that at least part of this effect is
driven by benefit design mechanisms.
The second strand of literature examines whether MA-PDPs internalize externali-
ties from prescription drugs. Previous studies show that MA-PDPs internalize positive
externalities from prescription drugs, as evidenced by the finding that, relative to SA-
PDPs, MA-PDPs set lower cost-sharing requirements for drugs that reduce hospitaliza-
tions (Lavetti and Simon, 2018; Starc and Town, 2019). By showing that MA-PDPs set
more restrictive utilization management rules for opioids, a class of drugs that has been
associated with increased hospitalizations, I provide evidence that MA-PDPs internalize
negative externalities from prescription drugs.
2.2 Background
The Medicare Part D program was first introduced through the Medicare Moderniza-
tion Act of 2003, and, beginning in 2006, Medicare beneficiaries were given the option
to enroll in a highly subsidized drug plan. The Part D program is administered by two
types of private health insurance plans: Medicare Advantage Part D Plans (MA-PDPs),
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which are integrated into parent Medicare Advantage plans, and Stand-Alone Part D
plans (SA-PDPs), which generally supplement enrollment into traditional fee-for-service
Medicare. While MA-PDPs operate at the county-level, SA-PDPs operate at a regional-
level, with 34 regions altogether. In exchange for providing coverage, both MA-PDPs and
SA-PDPs receive a monthly, risk-adjusted payment for each enrolled beneficiary. The
risk-adjustment formula factors in beneficiary diagnoses from the previous year, and the
payment is expected to cover the costs of enrollee drug expenditures.
Part D benefit design is characterized by two factors: coverage and cost-sharing re-
quirements (Figure 2.1). Part D plans begin by selecting a plan formulary, which con-
stitutes a list of covered drugs. Beneficiaries pay 100 percent of the costs of drugs that
do not appear on a plan formulary, while plans pay for all but the out-of-pockets costs
for drugs that do appear on this list. Part D formularies must abide by two regulations:
first, they must cover all drugs in six therapeutic classes (including anticancer drugs and
antiretroviral drugs). Second, Part D formularies must cover at least two drugs in each
U.S. Pharmacopeia therapeutic class, a drug classification system developed in response
to the Part D program. Opioids have consistently appeared on this list, meaning that
Part D plans have been required to provide coverage for at least two opioids since the
program’s introduction in 2006.
In addition to outlining the list of covered drugs, the plan formulary also lists utiliza-
tion management rules and the level of cost-sharing associated with each drug. Utilization
management rules are controls that Part D plans can impose on individual drugs to limit
the amount of medication that a beneficiary receives at a given time. These include prior
authorization requirements, quantity limit restrictions, and step therapy requirements.
Prior authorization requires that prescribers contact the Part D plan prior to issuing a
prescription. A quantity limit restriction sets a cap on the number of prescriptions that
the plan will cover within a given timeframe. Step therapy requires that beneficiaries try
a more cost-effective form of treatment (i.e. generic drug) before they can purchase a
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more expensive treatment (i.e. branded drug).
While Part D plans have only one formulary, the same formulary often corresponds to
multiple Part D plans. Cost-sharing requirements are determined at both the formulary-
level and the plan-level. Part D formularies are partitioned into tiers, and all drugs that
appear on the same tier have the same co-pay or coinsurance amount. Typically, Part
D formularies are stratified into four tiers, with lower tiers corresponding to lower cost-
sharing amounts and higher tiers corresponding to higher cost-sharing amounts. Part
D plans that share the same formulary have the same list of covered drugs and drug
tier placement; however, plans are given broad latitude in assigning levels of cost-sharing
across drug tiers. For example, while one plan might assign a five-dollar cost-sharing
requirement for all tier one drugs, another plan with the same formulary might assign an
eight-dollar requirement for the same set of (tier one) drugs. However, plans are required
to meet the minimum actuarial coverage mandated by the Part D “standard benefit,” a
complex, nonlinear benefit design. While the details of this pricing structure are beyond
the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that this requirement prevents plans from
setting overly generous or restrictive coverage for a large fraction of covered drugs.
2.2.1 Strategic Benefit Design in the Part D Program
The market-based design of the Part D program was intended to reward lower-cost
plans with greater market shares. However, a growing body of literature finds that Part
D plans attempt to increase profit margins through strategic benefit design. This occurs
along two dimensions – advantageous selection of profitable enrollees and internalizing
externalities from prescription drugs. The findings from both strands of literature offer
important implications for my empirical approach.
Two recent studies find that Part D plans exploit inaccuracies in Medicare risk-
adjustment models to advantageously select enrollees (Carey, 2017; Lavetti and Simon,
2018). The Medicare program uses risk-adjustment models to calculate the per-enrollee
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payments that private health insurers receive from the federal government in exchange
for providing either MA or Part D coverage (or both). These models assign individual-
ized risk scores to Medicare beneficiaries, with higher risk scores corresponding to higher
payments. The Part D risk-adjustment model assigns higher risk scores to beneficiaries
diagnosed with conditions that are associated with high drug expenditures, while the MA
risk-adjustment model assigns higher risk scores to beneficiaries diagnosed with condi-
tions that are associated with high physician and hospital expenditures. Individualizing
payments via risk-adjustment models is intended to make insurers indifferent between en-
rolling healthy and sick beneficiaries. However, inaccuracies in these models can motivate
plans to select along other dimensions.
When the Part D risk-adjustment model is not updated frequently, the entry of new
drugs and competitors generates inaccuracies in risk-adjusted payments. Because branded
drugs are not supplied competitively, diagnoses exposed to generic competition became
more profitable, while diagnoses exposed to new drug entry became less profitable. Carey
(2017) shows that SA-PDPs exploit new drug entry to advantageously select enrollees.
The study finds that SA-PDPs set lower out-of-pocket costs for drugs used in the treat-
ment of conditions made profitable by generic entry, while these plans set higher out-of-
pocket costs for drugs used in the treatment of conditions made unprofitable by brand
entry.
MA-PDPs have an incentive to attract enrollees with conditions made profitable due to
inaccuracies in the MA risk-adjustment model (McWilliams et al., 2012; Newhouse et al.,
2013; Brown et al., 2014). Lavetti and Simon (2018) show that, relative to SA-PDPs,
MA-PDPs offer more generous coverage for drugs taken by patients who are diagnosed
with conditions made profitable due to these inaccuracies. For example, the study finds
that MA-PDPs generally profit from enrolling beneficiaries with acute leukemia; flaws in
the MA risk-adjustment calculator make the costs of treatment associated with this con-
dition generally lower than the corresponding risk-adjusted payments. Because an acute
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leukemia diagnosis is predictive of fentanyl use, Lavetti and Simon (2018) hypothesize
that MA-PDPs offer more generous coverage for fentanyl products to attract enrollees
with this condition. In line with this hypothesis, they find that MA-PDP enrollees pay
80 percent less in out-of-pocket costs for fentanyl drugs relative to SA-PDP enrollees.
Because of the breadth of coverage that they provide, MA-PDPs also have a financial
incentive to consider the complementarity or substitutability between drug and non-drug
medical treatments when designing Part D benefits. Two recent studies examine whether
MA-PDPs harness benefit design to internalize positive externalities from prescription
drugs (Lavetti and Simon, 2018; Starc and Town, 2019). The empirical approach in these
studies is motivated by two previous findings; first, that consumers are price-sensitive
in their demand for drugs, and second, that drug treatments are effective in keeping
individuals with chronic conditions out of the hospital. In light of these findings, both
studies hypothesize that MA-PDPs offer more generous coverage for drugs that treat
chronic conditions relative to SA-PDPs. Lavetti and Simon (2018) find that out-of-pocket
costs for drugs used in the treatment of chronic conditions are six to eight percent lower
in MA-PDPs relative to SA-PDPs. Similarly, Starc and Town (2019) find that enrollment
in an MA-PDP increases beneficiary drug expenditures, with effects concentrated among
drugs used in the treatment of chronic conditions.
2.2.2 Efforts to Manage Opioid Use through Benefit Design
Several recent studies evaluate efforts by both public and private health insurers to
manage enrollee opioid use through benefit design. Morden et al. (2008) examine the
impact of state Medicaid prior authorization requirements on the use of extended release
oxycodone (OxyContin). They find that states with stricter requirements exhibited slower
growth in the use of these drugs. Garc´ıa et al. (2016) evaluate the effect of a 2012
initiative by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts that introduced prior authorization
requirements on new prescriptions for short-acting opioids and all extended release opioid
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prescriptions. They find that 21 million fewer opioid doses were administered in the three
years following the implementation of this requirement. Barnett et al. (2018) evaluate
a 2015 initiative by Blue Cross of California that introduced a strict prior authorization
requirement on extended release oxycodone. While they find that the initiative led to a
substantial reduction in the use of extended release oxycodone, this decline was offset by
an increase in the use of short acting oxycodone, resulting in no overall change in levels
of opioid use.
2.3 Data and Methods
I use Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information
Files from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to test for differences in benefit
design for opioids across MA-PDPs and SA-PDPs. These data contain detailed informa-
tion on the universe of Part D formularies and plans, including the list of covered drugs
on each formulary, utilization management rules corresponding to each formulary-drug
combination, and the level of cost-sharing associated with each plan-drug combination.
For formulary-drug combinations that have a quantity limit restriction, the data contain
both the quantity limit amount and the days limit; for example, 90 tablets within 30 days.
I use data from 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. These data years represent a period of
significant change in the medical community’s perception of safe opioid prescribing levels;
between 2009 and 2011, researchers documented a heightened risk of adverse health events
linked to high daily dosages of opioids, particularly among the elderly (Dunn et al., 2010;
Saunders et al., 2010; Bohnert et al., 2011).
I test for differences in utilization management rules across MA-PDPs and SA-PDPs
to determine whether MA-PDPs internalize negative externalities from opioids. I focus
on utilization management outcomes (rather than cost-sharing requirements), for two rea-
sons; first, my empirical approach is motivated by evidence from the medical literature
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on the link between high daily dosages of opioids and adverse health events. Utilization
management rules, including prior authorization requirements and quantity limit restric-
tions, can be used by Part D plans to both limit and manage daily dosages of opioids.
Conversely, cost-sharing requirements within the Part D program cannot be structured
around daily dosage levels.
Second, it is unclear what information can be gleaned from differences in cost-sharing
requirements for opioids. While higher cost-sharing requirements may be indicative of
plans’ efforts to limit enrollees’ opioid use more generally, this finding may also capture
other unknown factors. For example, Lavetti and Simon (2018) find that MA-PDPs set
lower cost-sharing requirements for fentanyl drugs to attract more profitable enrollees.
There is no evidence that inaccuracies in risk-adjustment models, or other potential con-
founders, are reflected in utilization management outcomes.
I construct four outcomes related to utilization management rules. First, I construct
an indicator for whether a formulary-drug combination corresponds with any utilization
management rule, which I define as either a prior authorization requirement or a quantity
limit restriction.1 Next, I construct separate indicators for prior authorization require-
ments and quantity limit restrictions. Finally, I calculate the maximum daily morphine
equivalent dosage (MED) allowed under each quantity limit restriction. This field is
constructed as follows: first, I identify the total morphine milligram equivalency corre-
sponding to the quantity limit restriction. This is calculated by multiplying the allowed
quantity amount by the drug strength and an ingredient specific conversion factor (Table
A.2). I then divide this figure by the corresponding days supply restriction. For example,
a quantity limit restriction of 90 tablets within 30 days for 10 milligrams of oxycodone
has a maximum daily MED allowance of 45 ((90*10*1.5)/30).
1I omit step therapy requirements from this analysis. Step therapy requirements are rarely used, and
there is no evidence that this requirement would be effective in managing enrollees’ use of opioids.
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2.3.1 Empirical Strategy
Because utilization management rules are determined at the formulary-level (rather
than the plan-level), I test for differences in benefit design for opioids at the formulary-
drug-level. I stratify Part D formularies into three categories. The first category is
comprised of formularies that are used exclusively by SA-PDPs (“SA-PDP Only”); the
second category is comprised of formularies that are used by both types of plans (“SA-
PDP and MA-PDP”); and, the third category is comprised of formularies that are used
exclusively by MA-PDPs (“MA-PDP Only”). Figure 2.2 provides an example of each
type of formulary from data year 2008. Formulary “00008371” is an example of an SA-
PDP Only formulary; this formulary is used by only one plan, “WellCare Classic”, an
SA-PDP. Formulary “00008307” is an example of an SA-PDP and MA-PDP formulary;
this formulary is used by both an SA-PDP (“BlueShield Medicare Rx Enhanced Plan”)
and an MA-PDP (“BlueShield 65 Plus”). Finally, formulary “00008308” is an example of
an MA-PDP Only formulary; this formulary is used exclusively by “BlueShield 65 Plus
Choice Plan (Partial)”, an MA-PDP.
The number of formularies generally increases throughout the sample period, going
from 211 in 2008 to 240 in 2015 (Figure 2.3). While the number of SA-PDP Only formu-
laries does not change substantially, the number of enrollees in SA-PDPs that use these
formularies doubles, going from nine million in 2008 to 18 million in 2015 (Figure 2.4).
The number of SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies is halved throughout the data years,
declining from 41 in 2008 to 20 in 2015; this corresponds with a substantial reduction in
the number of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D plans that use these formularies.
Conversely, the number of MA-PDP Only formularies generally increases throughout the
data years, going from 123 in 2008 to 176 in 2015. The increase in the number of MA-
PDP Only formularies corresponds with a significant rise in the number of enrollees in
MA-PDPs that use these formularies, increasing from three million in 2008 to 11 million
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in 2015.
Table 2.1 contains summary statistics for the sample of formularies used by Part D
plans. There are many more MA-PDP Only formularies (728) than there are SA-PDP
Only formularies (235) and SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies (142). While the average
SA-PDP Only formulary is used by 19 SA-PDPs, the average MA-PDP Only formulary
is used by only seven MA-PDPs. The average SA-PDP and MA-PDP formulary is used
by 27 Part D plans; roughly 13 of these plans are SA-PDPs, while 15 of these plans are
MA-PDPs. SA-PDP Only formularies have, on average, the largest number of Medicare
enrollees at over 260 thousand. MA-PDP Only formularies have, on average, the smallest
number of Medicare enrollees at 42 thousand. Given that SA-PDPs operate at a regional-
level (comprised of individual states or groups of states), while MA-PDPs operate at
the county-level, the differences in average enrollment levels across formulary types is
expected.
The average formulary contains 3,705 unique drug products (National Drug Codes), of
which 154 are opioids. However, there are significant differences in the average number of
covered drugs (and opioids) across formulary types. Formularies that correspond to both
SA-PDPs and MA-PDPs contain, on average, the highest number of covered drugs at four
thousand, with 178 opioids. MA-PDP Only formularies contain, on average, close to 3.7
thousand drugs, while SA-PDP Only formularies list only 3.6 thousand drugs. The smaller
number of covered drugs listed on both SA-PDP Only formularies and MA-PDP Only
formularies corresponds with a smaller number of covered opioids (150). All formularies
contain at least one opioid, in line with U.S. Pharmacopeia Guidelines.
To determine whether benefit design for prescription opioids differs across MA-PDPs
and SA-PDPs, I compare utilization management rules for opioids across the three dif-
ferent types of formularies. I hypothesize that, relative to opioids listed on formularies
used exclusively by SA-PDPs (SA-PDP Only), opioids listed on formularies used exclu-
sively by MA-PDPs (MA-PDP Only) are more likely to have a corresponding utilization
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management rule. This hypothesis emerges from the differences in coverage requirements
across MA-PDPs and SA-PDPs; MA-PDPs have an incentive to limit high dosage opioid
use, while SA-PDPs do not. Similarly, because SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies are
used by MA-PDPs, I hypothesize that opioids listed on these formularies will also be
more likely to have a corresponding utilization management rule relative to opioids listed
on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs. However, as evidenced in Figures 2.3 and
2.4, these formularies become much less prevalent later in the sample period, suggesting
that both MA-PDPs and SA-PDPs may find it more strategic to use formularies that are
tailored to their coverage.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics at the formulary-drug-level. Column 1 presents
sample means for drugs listed on all Part D formularies; column 2 presents sample means
for drugs listed on formularies that are used exclusively by SA-PDPs; column 3 presents
sample means for drugs listed on formularies that are used by SA-PDPs and MA-PDPs;
and, column 4 presents sample means for drugs listed on formularies that are used ex-
clusively by MA-PDPs. In columns 4 and 6, I present difference-in-means between drugs
listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies (column 4) and drugs listed on MA-PDP
Only formularies (column 6) relative to drugs listed on SA-PDP Only formularies.
In panel A of Table 2.2, I present summary statistics for all formulary-drug combi-
nations. Roughly one-quarter of drugs have any utilization management rule. SA-PDP
Only formularies have the highest percentage of drugs with any utilization management
rule, at 26.8 percent. These formularies also have the highest percentage of drugs with a
quantity limit restriction (15.4 percent). SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies have the low-
est percentage of drugs with a corresponding utilization management rule (24.5 percent),
and only 12.5 percent of drugs that appear on these formularies have a prior authoriza-
tion requirement. MA-PDP Only formularies have the lowest percentage of drugs with a
quantity limit restriction, at 13.8 percent.
In panel B of Table 2.2, I present summary statistics for all formulary-opioid combina-
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tions. Relative to all covered drugs, opioids are much more likely to have a corresponding
utilization management rule (46.3 percent versus 25.6 percent). This is primarily driven
by higher percentages of quantity limit restrictions (41.8 percent); conversely, the percent-
age of opioids with a prior authorization requirement is slightly lower than the percentage
of all drugs with this requirement (11.4 percent versus 14.1 percent ). MA-PDP Only
formularies have the highest percentage of opioids with a quantity limit restriction (42.9
percent); this figure is over three percentage points higher than the percentage of opioids
listed on SA-PDP Only formularies with a quantity limit restriction (39.2 percent). At 167
milligrams per day, MA-PDP Only formularies have the lowest average maximum daily
MED allowance; this figure is roughly ten milligrams lower than the average allowance
corresponding to opioids listed on SA-PDP Only formularies with a quantity limit restric-
tion, and seven milligrams lower than opioids listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies
with a quantity limit restriction.
2.3.2 Econometric Methods
The summary statistics presented in Table 2.2 suggest that MA-PDPs harness benefit
design to manage enrollees’ opioid use. While drugs listed on formularies used by MA-
PDPs are generally less likely to have a corresponding utilization management rule relative
to drugs listed on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs, opioids listed on formularies
used by MA-PDPs are generally more likely to have a utilization management rule relative
to opioids listed on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs. However, these differences
may capture factors that are unrelated to efforts by MA-PDPs to manage daily dosage
levels through benefit design. For example, these differences may reflect coverage for
different drugs. If MA-PDPs are more likely to cover fentanyl drugs relative to SA-PDPs
(and fentanyl drugs are more likely to correspond with a utilization management rule),
then this would discredit the interpretation that MA-PDPs harness benefit design to
manage enrollees’ opioid use. To probe this issue, I estimate the following specification
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on the sample of formulary-opioid combinations:
Yd(i)ft = β0 + β1SAandMAf + β2MAOnlyf + γt + [(γt × τi) + (γt × αd)] + d(i)ft (2.1)
Yd(i)ft represents utilization management outcome for opioid drug d (with primary
ingredient i) listed on formulary f in year t. SAandMAf is an indicator for whether the
opioid drug corresponds with an SA-PDP and MA-PDP formulary and MAOnlyf is an
indicator for whether the opioid drug corresponds with an MA-PDP Only formulary. The
omitted formulary category is that corresponding to formularies that are used exclusively
by SA-PDPs (SA-PDP Only). Equation 2.1 contains year fixed effects (γt) to control for
benefit design shocks that are common across all formularies with a given year. d(i)ft is
an error term that allows for arbitrary correlation within formularies.
β1 and β2 are the coefficients of interest in Equation 2.1. Estimates of β1 and β2
capture the average differences in benefit design outcomes for opioids covered on SA-PDP
and MA-PDP formularies (β1) and opioids covered on MA-PDP Only formularies (β2),
relative to opioids covered on formularies that are used exclusively by SA-PDPs. Because
MA-PDPs have an incentive to consider the link between enrollee opioid use and adverse
health events (and SA-PDPs do not face this incentive), I hypothesize that β1 > 0 and
β2 > 0 for binary utilization management outcomes. Positive estimates of β1 and β2 would
imply that opioids listed on formularies used by MA-PDPs have more restrictive benefit
design requirements relative to opioids listed on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs.
For the continuous maximum daily MED allowance outcome, I hypothesize that β1 < 0
and β2 < 0; a negative estimate would indicate that formularies used by MA-PDPs have
a lower maximum daily dosage allowance relative to formularies used exclusively by SA-
PDPs. I estimate the logarithmic transformation of maximum daily MED allowance; a
Box-Cox test strongly favors the log specification, with a parameter estimate of 0.0001.
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In addition to baseline estimates of Equation 2.1, I also present estimates from models
that include year by ingredient effects (γt × τi) and year by drug effects (γt × αd). I
compare estimates of β1 and β2 from models that include these additional controls to
probe whether differences in benefit exist within coverage for the same year-ingredient
combinations (i.e. oxycodone in 2009) and coverage for the same year-drug combinations
(i.e. OxyContin 20 milligrams in 2009). I estimate all models via ordinary least squares
(OLS).
2.4 Results
Table 2.3 contains estimates of β1 and β2 from Equation 2.1. Columns 1 through
3 present estimates from models in which the outcome is any utilization management
rule; columns 4 through 6 present estimates from models in which the outcome is a prior
authorization requirement; columns 7 through 9 present estimates from models in which
the outcome is a quantity limit restriction; and, columns 10 through 12 present estimates
from models in which the outcome is the logarithmic transformation of the maximum
daily MED allowance, conditional on a quantity limit restriction. Within each outcome, I
present estimates from the baseline model, as well as estimates from models that include
year by ingredient effects and year by drug effects.
Relative to opioids listed on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs, opioids listed
on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies are more likely to have a corresponding utilization
management rule. The estimate of 0.06 represents a 13 percent increase from the overall
percentage of opioids with any utilization management rule (46.3 percent). The inclusion
of both year by ingredient effects and year by drug effects has minimal impact on either
the magnitude or the precision of estimates of β1, indicating that differences in utilization
management rules persist within coverage for the same ingredients and drugs within the
same year. Opioids listed on MA-PDP Only formularies are, on average, less likely to have
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a corresponding utilization management rule relative to opioids listed on SA-PDP Only
formularies. However, the estimate of -0.02 is small in magnitude, representing only a 3.5
percent decline from the overall mean, and imprecise. The inclusion of year by ingredient
effects and year by drug effects again has minimal impact on either the magnitude or the
precision of these estimates.
The increased likelihood of a utilization management rule among opioids listed on
SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies is driven by higher rates of quantity limit restrictions.
Relative to opioids listed on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs, opioids listed on
SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies are, on average, seven percentage points more likely
to have a corresponding quantity limit restriction. This represents a 17 percent increase
from the overall mean of 42 percent. This estimate is significant at the one-percent level,
and insensitive to the inclusion of year by ingredient effects and year by drug effects.
Conversely, there is no statistical difference in the likelihood of a prior authorization
requirement across opioids listed on SA-PDP Only formularies and opioids listed on SA-
PDP and MA-PDP formularies; while the estimate of 0.01 constitutes a ten percent
increase from the overall mean of 11 percent, this estimate is noisy and I am unable to
rule out large effects in either direction.
Relative to opioids listed on SA-PDP Only formularies, opioids listed on MA-PDP
Only formularies are less likely to have either a prior authorization requirement or a
quantity limit restriction. Estimates of β2 corresponding to both of these outcomes indi-
cate a one percentage point reduction; this ranges from a three percent reduction from
the overall quantity limit restriction rate (42 percent), to an 11 percent reduction from
the overall prior authorization requirement (11 percent). However, all estimates are noisy,
and I am unable to rule out large effects in either direction when the outcome is a prior
authorization requirement.
Although opioids listed on MA-PDP Only formularies are less likely to have a quan-
tity limit restriction than opioids listed on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs,
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conditional on having a quantity limit restriction, opioids listed on these formularies have
substantially lower maximum daily MED allowances. The estimate of -0.06 implies that,
on average, the maximum daily MED allowance is six percent lower among opioids listed
on MA-PDP Only formularies relative to opioids listed on SA-PDP Only formularies.
This estimate is significant at the one-percent level. Although the inclusion of year by
ingredient effects and year by drug effects reduces the magnitude of the estimate, these
estimates continue to indicate a statistically significant difference.
Conditional on a quantity limit restriction, opioids listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP
formularies have, on average, a six percent lower maximum daily MED allowance relative
to opioids listed on SA-PDP Only formularies. While this estimate is significant at the
five-percent level, the inclusion of year by ingredient effects and year by drug effects
reduces both the magnitude and the precision of this estimate. These results suggest that
the differences in daily MED allowances across these two types of formularies are driven
by differences in MED allowances for opioids that are specific to formulary types, rather
than opioids that are common across both formulary types.
2.5 Sensitivity Analyses
2.5.1 Utilization Management Rules for Other Drugs
The results indicate that opioids listed on formularies used by MA-PDPs are more
likely to correspond with a utilization management rule relative to opioids listed on for-
mularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs. While this finding may be indicative of efforts by
MA-PDPs to limit or manage enrollees’ use of opioids, it may also reflect the fact that
MA-PDPs use formularies with higher rates of utilization management rules across all
covered drugs, not just opioids. As a result, the findings may capture restrictive bene-
fit design more broadly, as opposed to utilization management rules tailored specifically
towards opioids.
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To determine whether formularies used by MA-PDPs impose stricter utilization
management rules more broadly, I estimate the following specification across all drug-
formulary combinations:
Ydft = δ0 + δ1SAandMAf + δ2MAOnlyf + δ3SAandMAf ×Opioidd
+ δ4MAOnlyf ×Opioidd + γt + γt ×Opioidd + [γt × αd] + dft (2.2)
Ydft represents utilization management outcome for drug d listed on formulary f in year
t. Outcomes include any utilization management rule, a prior authorization requirement,
and a quantity limit restriction. Because maximum daily MED allowance is specific
to opioids, I exclude this outcome from the analysis. Equation 2.2 includes year fixed
effects (γt) fully interacted with an indicator for whether the listed drug is an opioid
(γt ×Opioidd).
The coefficients of interest in Equation 2.2 are δ1, δ2, δ3, and δ4. δ1 and δ2 capture the
average difference in utilization management rules for non-opioid drugs listed on SA-PDP
and MA-PDP formularies (δ1) and non-opioid drugs listed on MA-PDP Only formularies
(δ2), relative to non-opioid drugs listed on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs. δ3
and δ4 capture the average difference in utilization management rules for opioids listed on
SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies (δ3) and opioids listed on MA-PDP Only formularies
(δ4), relative to the coverage restrictions for non-opioids within formulary types. In addi-
tion to the baseline model, I also present estimates from models that include year by drug
effects (γt × αd) to determine whether differences in utilization management rules exist
within coverage for the same year-drug combinations. Standard errors are again clustered
at the formulary-level, and I estimate all models via OLS.
Table B.1 presents estimates of δ1, δ2, δ3, and δ4 from Equation 2.2. Columns 1 and
2 contain estimates from models in which the outcome is any utilization management
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rule; columns 3 and 4 contain estimates from models in which the outcome is a prior
authorization requirement; and, columns 5 and 6 contain estimates from models in which
the outcome is a quantity limit restriction. Odd-numbered columns contain estimates
from the baseline model, while even-numbered columns contain estimates from models
which include year by drug effects.
On average, non-opioid drugs listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies are less
likely to have a utilization management rule relative to non-opioid drugs listed on formu-
laries used exclusively by SA-PDPs. This is driven by lower rates of prior authorization
requirements; the estimate of -0.01 implies a seven percent reduction from the overall
mean (14 percent). Conversely, opioids listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies are
seven percentage points more likely to have a utilization management rule relative to
non-opioid drugs listed on these formularies. Non-opioid drugs listed on MA-PDP Only
formularies are substantially less likely to have a utilization management rule relative to
non-opioid drugs listed on SA-PDP Only formularies. The estimate of -0.02 implies a nine
percent reduction from the mean of 26 percent. This is driven by a significantly lower
likelihood of a quantity limit restriction. Across all outcomes, the inclusion of year by
drug effects has minimal impact on either the magnitude or the precision of the estimates.
The results offer no evidence that formularies used by MA-PDPs have more restrictive
utilization management rules across all drugs relative to formularies used exclusively by
SA-PDPs. Rather, drugs listed on formularies used by MA-PDPs are generally less likely
to have a corresponding utilization management rule.
2.5.2 Parent Organization Analysis
The analysis thus far has designated Part D formularies as distinct entities. However,
Part D formularies are often linked to the same parent organization; these are organi-
zations that oversee the operation of multiple Part D plans. For example, in Figure 2.2
formulary “00008307” and formulary “00008308” are both linked to the same parent or-
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ganization (“BlueShield of California”). In this section, I examine whether differences
in benefit design persist within formularies linked to the same parent organization. If
these differences persist, this finding would imply that parent organizations strategically
designate formularies with more restrictive opioid benefit design to MA-PDPs. If these
differences do not persist, this could suggest that the main estimates are driven by dif-
ferences in information across insurance companies, rather than strategic benefit design
(Lavetti and Simon, 2018).
To conduct this analysis, I use Part D Plan Enrollment Files through CMS to identify
parent organizations associated with each Part D formulary. I limit the sample to formu-
laries that correspond with one parent organization only. This removes from the analysis
26 formularies that are associated with multiple parent organizations (out of 1,105).2 To
test for differences within parent organizations, I re-estimate Equation 2.1 with the in-
clusion of year by parent organization effects, year by parent organization by ingredient
effects, and year by parent organization by drug effects. All estimates are identified off of
opioids listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies and opioids listed on MA-PDP Only
formularies that share a parent organization with at least one SA-PDP Only formulary
during the same year.
Table B.2 contains estimates of β1 and β2 from Equation 2.1. Because the sample
of formulary-opioid combinations changes with the removal of 26 formularies from this
analysis, I re-estimate Equation 2.1 on the reduced sample. Panel A contains estimates of
Equation 2.1 from the reduced sample. Panel B contains estimates of Equation 2.1 with
the additional layers of parent organization effects.
The estimates in panel A mirror the estimates from the full sample of formulary-opioid
combinations in sign. However, there are several discrepancies in the magnitude and the
precision of the estimates. Estimates of β1 (SA-PDP and MA-PDP) corresponding to
models in which the outcomes are any utilization management rule or a quantity limit
2These formularies correspond to four percent of the enrolled population.
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restriction are smaller in magnitude and less precise than the main estimates. However,
they continue to indicate a statistical difference in quantity limit restrictions. Additionally,
estimates of β2 (MA-PDP Only) are smaller in magnitude when the outcome is the natural
logarithm of maximum daily MED allowance. However, these estimates remain significant
at the one-percent level.
The inclusion of parent organization effects impacts the estimates in several ways.
Opioids listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies remain four percentage points more
likely to have a quantity limit restriction relative to opioids listed on SA-PDP Only
formularies. However, this estimate is not significant with the inclusion of drug effects.
The maximum daily MED allowance corresponding to opioids listed on MA-PDP Only
formularies is, on average, now only two percent lower than that of opioids listed on
SA-PDP Only formularies with a quantity limit restriction. This estimate is noisy and
declines in magnitude with the inclusion of ingredient and drug effects. This imprecision
may reflect the fact that there are a limited number of SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies
(42) and MA-PDP Only formularies (152) that share a parent organization with an SA-
PDP Only formulary. However, a comparison of the estimates suggests that at least part
of the differences in benefit design for opioids may be driven by differences in information
across insurance companies.
2.5.3 Benefit Design Over Time
Data years 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 constitute a period of significant change
in the medical community’s assessment of safe opioid prescribing levels. The changes
in utilization management outcomes that occur throughout the sample period reflect an
increased awareness of the dangers associated with opioid overprescribing. While the
percentage of all drugs with a corresponding utilization management rule increases from
20 percent in 2008 to 30 percent in 2015, the percentage of opioids with a corresponding
utilization management rule rises from 25 percent in 2008 to over 80 percent in 2015
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(Figure B.1 and Figure B.2). This is largely driven by an increase in quantity limit
restrictions for opioids. However, increased quantity limit restrictions are not accompanied
by changes in maximum daily MED allowances; while the average maximum daily MED
allowance declines somewhat for opioids listed on SA-PDP Only formularies, there is no
change in maximum daily MED allowances among opioids listed on formularies used by
MA-PDPs.
In this section, I test for differences in benefit design for opioids throughout the sample
period by re-estimating Equation 2.1 across individual data years. Estimates of β1 and β2
from this analysis are presented in Table B.3. I also present estimates from models that
include drug effects in Figure B.3.
Opioids listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies are significantly more likely to
have a quantity limit restriction than opioids listed on formularies used exclusively by
SA-PDPs in 2008. The estimate of 0.11 is significant at the five-percent level, and con-
stitutes a 60 percent increase from the mean of 18 percent. This estimate is robust to
the inclusion of both ingredient and drug effects. Opioids listed on both SA-PDP and
MA-PDP formularies and MA-PDP Only formularies have, on average, a 30 percent lower
maximum daily MED allowance relative to opioids listed on SA-PDP Only formularies in
2008. Although the magnitude of these estimates declines with the inclusion of ingredient
and drug effects, these estimates remain significant at conventional levels and continue to
represent a considerable difference (seven to nine percent).
After 2008, the differences in benefit design for opioids across formulary types dissipate.
While opioids listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies are generally more likely to
be subject to a quantity limit restriction, these estimates are noisy. Opioids listed on
MA-PDP Only formularies are substantially less likely to have a corresponding quantity
limit restriction in 2015; the estimate of -0.13 is significant at the one-percent level, and
constitutes a 17 percent decline from the mean of 78 percent during this year. In 2013,
the maximum daily MED allowance is, on average, 14 percent higher among opioids
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listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies relative to opioids listed on formularies used
exclusively by SA-PDPs; although this estimate is significant at the one-percent level, it
is substantially smaller in magnitude and imprecise with the inclusion of ingredient and
drug effects. Throughout the data years, the average maximum daily MED allowance
corresponding to opioids listed on MA-PDP Only formularies is generally lower than that
corresponding to SA-PDP Only formularies. However, the only estimate that is significant
at conventional levels is that corresponding to data year 2015 (-0.06).
2.6 Analysis of Propoxyphene Drugs
In a related study, I find that enrollment in an MA-PDP lowered daily dosages of
opioids during the years 2008 and 2009 (Rhodes, 2020). Lower dosages during these years
were driven by the effect of MA-PDP enrollment on propoxyphene use (brand names
Darvon and Darvocet), a high dosage opioid. Although propoxyphene was withdrawn
from the market in 2010, the dangerous side-effects associated with propoxyphene use,
including risk of overdose and abnormal heart rhythms, were known well in advance of
the drug’s 2010 withdrawal; the first petition to remove propoxyphene from the market
occurred in 1976 (Wilson, 2010). In Rhodes (2020), I find that enrollment in an MA-PDP
lowered the probability of propoxyphene use by 76 percent relative to enrollment in an
SA-PDP. In this section, I examine whether benefit design served as a mechanism through
which MA-PDPs reduced propoxyphene use.
I begin by testing for differences in coverage for any propoxyphene drug across formu-
lary types. For each Part D formulary, I create a binary indicator that equals one if the
formulary covered at least one propoxyphene drug and zero otherwise. I collapse the data
at the formulary-level, and I estimate the following specification across all formularies:
Yft = θ0 + θ1SAandMAf + θ2MAOnlyf + γt + ft (2.3)
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Yft represents coverage outcome for formulary f in year t. In addition to estimating
models in which the outcome is any propoxyphene coverage, I also estimate separate
models for each opioid ingredient (i.e. any oxycodone drug, any tramadol drug, etc. . . )
to determine whether differences in coverage exist more broadly. Estimates of θ1 and
θ2 capture the average difference in coverage for a given ingredient across MA-PDP and
SA-PDP formularies (θ1) and MA-PDP Only formularies (θ2) relative to formularies used
exclusively by SA-PDPs. I also estimate models weighted by total Medicare enrollment to
determine whether the estimates vary when assigning greater weight to formularies used
by a greater population of enrollees. All models are estimated via OLS.
Estimates of θ1 and θ2 from Equation 2.3 are presented in Table B.4. For each opioid
ingredient, I present estimates from the unweighted model (column 1), as well as estimates
from the weighted model (column 2). I also present estimates from the unweighted models
in Figure B.4.
SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies and MA-PDP Only formularies are generally more
likely to cover a given opioid ingredient relative to formularies used exclusively by SA-
PDPs. In instances where estimates of θ1 and θ2 are negative, the estimates are generally
noisy and I am unable to rule out a null effect. There are two notable exceptions; MA-PDP
Only formularies are less likely to cover any methadone or propoxyphene drug. MA-PDP
Only formularies are six percentage points less likely to cover a methadone drug; this
represents a six percent decline from the mean rate of coverage for any methadone drug
(96 percent). MA-PDP Only formularies were 16 percentage points less likely to cover at
least one propoxyphene drug during 2008 and 2009 relative to formularies used exclusively
by SA-PDPs; this constitutes an 18 percent reduction from the mean coverage rate for
propoxyphene of 88 percent. The estimates from enrollment weighted models are not
qualitatively different.
In addition to testing for differences in coverage for any propoxyphene drug, I also
examine whether there are differences in benefit design conditional on propoxyphene cov-
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erage. In Table B.5, I present estimates of Equation 2.1 stratified by propoxyphene drugs
that appear across formularies in 2008 and 2009 and non-propoxyphene opioids that ap-
pear across formularies during the same years. Relative to propoxyphene drugs listed
on SA-PDP Only formularies, propoxyphene drugs listed on MA-PDP Only formularies
are less likely to have a corresponding prior authorization requirement; however, they
are more likely to have a quantity limit restriction. Conditional on a quantity limit re-
striction, the maximum daily MED allowance is, on average, lower among propoxyphene
drugs listed on both SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies and MA-PDP Only formularies.
While these estimates are not significant at conventional levels, both estimates increase
in magnitude and precision with the inclusion of year by drug effects.
The estimates in Table B.5 indicate similar differences in utilization management rules
for non-propoxyphene opioids during the years 2008 and 2009. Non-propoxyphene opi-
oids listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies are more likely to have a quantity limit
restriction relative to non-propoxyphene opioids listed on SA-PDP Only formularies. Con-
ditional on a quantity limit restriction, non-propoxyphene opioids on both SA-PDP and
MA-PDP formularies and MA-PDP Only formularies have, on average, a lower maximum
daily MED allowance relative to those listed on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs.
These results suggest that MA-PDPs were more likely to impose utilization management
rules across all opioids in 2008 and 2009, and not just on propoxyphene drugs.
2.7 Discussion
This study adds to a literature that examines whether integrated MA-PDPs internalize
externalities from prescription drugs. I test the hypothesis that MA-PDPs set more
restrictive benefit design for prescription opioids relative to SA-PDPs; because of the
breadth of coverage that MA-PDPs provide, these plans have an incentive to consider
the link between high dosages of opioids and adverse health events. SA-PDPs face no
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such incentive. I find evidence that supports this hypothesis. Relative to opioids listed
on formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs, opioids listed on formularies used by both
SA-PDPs and MA-PDPs are more likely to have a quantity limit restriction. Conditional
on having a quantity limit restriction, opioids listed on formularies used exclusively by
MA-PDPs have lower daily dosage allowances relative to opioids listed on formularies
used exclusively by SA-PDPs. Sensitivity analysis indicates that these findings may be
partially driven by differences in information across insurance companies. However, these
differences do not explain the full effect, suggesting that MA-PDPs strategically design
benefits for opioids.
This study also adds to a literature that examines the effect of MA-PDP enrollment
on opioid use. In a related study, I find that, relative to enrollment in an SA-PDP,
enrollment in an MA-PDP lowered the likelihood of propoxyphene use (Rhodes, 2020).
In this study, I find evidence that benefit design may have served as a mechanism through
which MA-PDPs reduced propoxyphene use; during the years 2008 and 2009, formularies
used exclusively by MA-PDPs were substantially less likely to cover propoxyphene relative
to formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs. In addition, I find that formularies used
exclusively by MA-PDPs were less likely to cover methadone, a class of drugs generally
used in the treatment of opioid use disorder. This finding may reflect plan efforts to deter
enrollees with this condition, although further research on this issue is needed.
Previous literature also finds that, relative to enrollment in an SA-PDP, enrollment in
an MA-PDP lowers the likelihood of any opioid use (Baker et al., 2020; Rhodes, 2020).
If this effect was driven by benefit design initiatives, it would likely manifest through
prior authorization requirements. I find no evidence of differences in prior authorization
requirements across formularies used exclusively by SA-PDPs and formularies used by
MA-PDPs. This suggests that MA-PDPs lower the likelihood of any opioid use through
other mechanisms, such as coordination with providers. Indeed, Baker et al. (2020) find
that MA-PDP enrollment lowers the likelihood of receiving a prescription from a high
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volume opioid prescriber, suggesting that MA-PDPs may avoid contracting with “riskier”
prescribers. Future work should examine the extent to which plans also coordinate with
contracted providers to monitor enrollees’ opioid use.
This study has several limitations. First, I am unable to distinguish between differ-
ent types of prior authorization requirements and quantity limit restrictions. Previous
literature finds that more restrictive utilization management rules are most effective in
reducing opioid use (Morden et al., 2008). To the extent that utilization management
rules vary across Part D formularies in terms of strictness, this may differentially impact
how effective these rules are in limiting high dosage opioid use.
Second, because formularies often span multiple counties, states, and regions, I am
unable to control for geographic characteristics in my empirical approach. If, for example,
MA-PDPs are more prevalent in states with increased regulations on opioid use than SA-
PDPs, than more restrictive benefit design may be the result of state requirements rather
than MA-PDP incentives. However, there are two reasons why geographic differences are
unlikely to be driving the results. First, opioid abuse is uncommon among the elderly
Part D population. While these formularies may also be linked to the under-65 Medicare
population (who are at a higher risk of opioid abuse), it seems unlikely that formularies
would be tailored to this population of beneficiaries. Second, I find that differences in
benefit design for opioids across MA-PDPs and SA-PDPs is most pronounced in 2008,
prior to the onset of many state initiatives.
A third limitation is that it is not well understood how Part D plans choose a formulary.
Part D plans (or parent organizations) may develop their own formularies, or, they may
coordinate with pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs) to identify a suitable formulary.
PBMs, private companies that administer prescription drug benefits, play a prominent role
in the Part D program. However, little is know about their coordination with individual
Part D plans. Future research should examine the extent to which individual plans design
formularies and corresponding utilization management rules.
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Figure 2.1: Part D Benefit Design Choices
 
 
   1. Formulary Restrictions             2. Cost-Sharing Requirements 





       
         Covered Drugs          
       List of National Drug Codes (NDCs) 
                  
    
 
   (NDC Level)                 (Drug Tier) 
 
All products (NDCs) within a tier have 
            the same cost-sharing rules. Ex… A Part D  
            plan with a 4 tier formulary*:       
Utilization Management      Tier Placement      
            Tier 1 Drugs: $10  
1) Prior Authorization Requirement       Tier 2 Drugs: $43 
2) Quantity Limit Restriction        Tier 3 Drugs: $95 
a. Quantity Limit Amount        Tier 4 Drugs: 33% Coinsurance  
b. Quantity Limit Days         
3) Step Therapy Requirement 
 
*Cost-sharing amounts may vary by the following factors: coverage phase (i.e. deductible, initial coverage limit, donut hole, 
etc…); days supply (i.e. 30 day, 60 day, etc…); and, pharmacy type (preferred pharmacy, mail-order, etc…). However, all drugs 
within the same drug tier are subject to the same cost-sharing requirements. 
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Figure 2.2: Formulary Type Examples (From Data Year 2008)
 






Parent      WellCare Health             Blue Shield of California 







Plan                 WellCare     BlueShield Medicare Rx     BlueShield 65    BlueShield 65 Plus                                                                                                         
Name:               Classic                 Enhanced Plan                      Plus           Choice Plan (Partial) 





Formulary ID:       00008371                        00008307         00008308                 
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2008 2009 2011 2013 2015
Each bar contains the number of formularies that appear within a year, stratified by SA-PDP Only formularies, SA-PDP and MA-PDP
formularies, and MA-PDP Only formularies.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
SA-PDP Only SA-PDP and MA-PDP MA-PDP Only
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2008 2009 2011 2013 2015
Each bar contains the number of Medicare enrollees, stratified by SA-PDP Only formularies, SA-PDP and MA-PDP
formularies, and MA-PDP Only formularies.
Data Sources: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files, and CMS Plan
Enrollment Files.
SA-PDP Only SA-PDP and MA-PDP MA-PDP Only
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Table 2.1: Sample Means at the Formulary-Level
All Formularies SA-PDP Only SA-PDP and MA-PDP MA-PDP Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Part D Plans 12.4 19.3 27.3 7.3
SA-PDPs 5.7 19.3 12.6 0
MA-PDPs 6.78 0 14.8 7.3
Enrollees 110,544 261,074 214,721 41,633
NDCs 3,705 3,605 3,949 3,689
Opioid NDCs 154 149 178 151
Any Opioid (%) 1 1 1 1
N 1,105 235 142 728
Note: The table reports sample means at the formulary-level.
Sources: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files, and CMS
Plan Enrollment Files.
81
Table 2.2: Sample Means at the Formulary-Drug-Level
All Formularies SA-PDP Only SA-PDP and MA-PDP MA-PDP Only
Mean Mean Mean Diff Mean Diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. All Drugs
Any UM (%) 0.2564 0.2683 0.2459 -0.022c 0.2548 -0.013
PA (%) 0.1413 0.1431 0.1253 -0.018b 0.1441 0.001
QL (%) 0.1431 0.1544 0.1486 -0.006 0.1383 -0.016b
N 4,093,765 847,074 560,774 2,685,917
B. Opioids
Any UM (%) 0.4629 0.4417 0.4496 0.008 0.4728 0.031
PA (%) 0.1138 0.1158 0.1219 0.006 0.1114 -0.004
QL (%) 0.4179 0.3916 0.4035 0.012 0.4294 0.038
QL Daily MED* 169.77 177.25 173.96 -3.29 166.71 -10.54a
N 170,545 34,942 25,322 110,281
Notes: The table reports sample means at the formulary-drug-level. Panel A contains sample means for all listed
drugs; panel B contains sample means for all listed opioids. Column 1 presents sample means for drugs listed on
all Part D formularies; column 2 presents sample means for drugs listed on formularies that are used exclusively
by SA-PDPs; column 3 presents sample means for drugs listed on formularies that are used by both SA-PDPs and
MA-PDPs; and, column 5 presents sample means for drugs that are listed on formularies that are used exclusively by
MA-PDPs. Columns 4 and 6 report differences in means between drugs listed on SA-PDP and MA-PDP formularies
(column 4) and MA-PDP Only formularies (column 6) relative to drugs listed on SA-PDP Only formularies. “PA”
denotes prior authorization requirement; “QL” denotes quantity limit restriction; and, “QL Daily MED” denotes the
maximum daily MED allowance that corresponds with a quantity limit restriction.
Superscripts a, b, and c denote p-values from a difference-in-means hypothesis test (with heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered at the formulary-level). cp< 0.10, b p< 0.05, a p< 0.01.
*Conditional on a quantity limit restriction.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
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Table 2.3: Analysis of Opioid Utilization Management Rules
Any UM Prior Authorization Quantity Limit ln(Daily MED)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.062** 0.058** 0.057** 0.011 0.009 0.003 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.068*** -0.063** -0.028 -0.013
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.022) (0.019)
MA-PDP Only -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.0128 -0.0101 -0.0098 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.058*** -0.041*** -0.033***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.0092) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.013) (0.012)
Outcome Mean* 0.4630 0.4630 0.4630 0.1138 0.1138 0.1138 0.4179 0.4179 0.4179 169.77 169.77 169.77
Year FEs X X X X
Year x Ing FEs X X X X
Year x NDC FEs X X X X
Observations 170,545 170,545 170,545 170,545 170,545 170,545 170,545 170,545 170,545 71,263 71,263 71,263
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 (SA-PDP & MA-PDP) and β2 (MA-PDP Only) from Equation 2.1. The sample includes prescription opioids that appear
throughout the data years. Columns 1, 2, and 3 present estimates from models in which any utilization management (UM) rule is the outcome; Columns 4, 5, and 6
present estimates from models in which the outcome is a prior authoization requirement; columns 7, 8, and 9 present estimates from models in which the outcome is a
quantity limit restriction; and, columns 10, 11, and 12 present estimates from models in which the outcome is the natural logarithm of the maximum daily morphine
equivalent dosage (MED) allowance, conditional on a quantity limit restriction. Columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 include year fixed effects; columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 include
ingredient by year effects (ex...“oxycodone X 2011”); and, columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 include year by NDC effects. Standard errors are clustered at the formulary level.
*p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
*The means corresponding to Daily MED are not log-transformed.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
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CHAPTER III
Changes in the Utilization of Mental Health Care
Services and Mental Health at the Onset of Medicare
3.1 Introduction
Nearly all U.S. citizens become eligible for Medicare coverage at age 65. Because of
this, Medicare has been referred to as “Nearly Universal Health Insurance Coverage,”
and a recent proposal for single-payer health care in the U.S. has been termed “Medicare
for all” (Card et al., 2008; berniesanders.com, 2020). The discrete onset of Medicare
eligibility results in an exogenous shock to health insurance coverage rates at age 65.
This minimizes many of the selection issues that are often apparent in health insurance
settings, and presents a unique opportunity to examine the interaction between health
insurance and health outcomes.
Previous research has found that the onset of Medicare is accompanied by increases
in the utilization of several types of health care (Decker, 2005; Card et al., 2008). This
study furthers this literature by testing the impact of changes in health insurance coverage
at age 65 on the utilization of mental health care services and mental health. Using a
nationally representative sample, changes in three outcomes are considered: financial
barriers to mental health care, visits with mental health professionals, and self-reported
mental health.
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This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, for many
individuals, qualifying for Medicare represents a transition from uninsured to insured
status. As a result, this study provides insight on the causal effect of health insurance
coverage on mental health care utilization and mental health. Previous literature has
found that the uninsured are less likely to receive treatment for mental disorders than
individuals with health insurance coverage (Cooper-Patrick et al., 1999; Druss et al., 2000;
McAlpine and Mechanic, 2000). It is unclear, however, if the previously uninsured would
change their utilization of mental health services upon gaining coverage, holding all else
constant. This relationship is generally difficult to identify; experiments that randomize
coverage status across individuals are costly and difficult to conduct, and population-wide
exogenous shocks to health insurance coverage do not commonly occur in natural settings
(Levy and Meltzer, 2008). The identification strategy employed in this study, a regression
discontinuity design, facilitates credible causal inference.
Second, although previous studies find that the prevalence of mental illness tends to
decline with age, increased access to mental health care may still be of benefit to the
elderly (Kessler et al., 2005; Neighbors et al., 2007). A 2009 report found that more than
6.5 of the 35 million Americans aged 65 or older suffer from depression (Duckworth, 2009).
A better understanding of the interaction between Medicare coverage and mental health
care could lead to more efficient and improved treatment.
Third, this study furthers our understanding of the relationship between socioeco-
nomic status and mental health. Previous research documents a strong link between the
prevalence of mental illness and lower socioeconomic status (Kessler et al., 2005; Neighbors
et al., 2007; Donisi et al., 2013). However, these studies generally focus on the non-elderly
population. This study examines if the correlation between mental health and socioeco-
nomic status persists among the elderly, and whether universal health insurance coverage
alters these patterns. To examine this relationship, all analysis is conducted on samples
that are stratified by education level to test for heterogeneous treatment effects across
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socioeconomic groups.
In a preview of the findings, this study documents changes in health insurance coverage
rates at age 65 that are consistent with previous studies (Decker, 2005; Card et al., 2008).
Individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds experience large gains in Medicare
coverage, corresponding with an increase in the probability of having any health insurance
coverage. Individuals from higher socioeconomic backgrounds also exhibit significant
increases in Medicare coverage rates; however, this change is accompanied by reductions
in private insurance. The overall gains in coverage are associated with a decrease in
the probability of needing mental health care but not obtaining such care because of
prohibitive costs. This effect is greatest among individuals from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds. Despite this finding, there is no significant change in mental health visits
upon reaching Medicare eligibility; however, estimates corresponding to mental health
visits are imprecise, and large changes relative to pre-Medicare levels cannot be ruled out,
especially among individuals from lower and middle socioeconomic groups. No changes
in self-reported mental health are identified at age 65.
3.2 Background and Previous Findings
This study examines if changes in the utilization of mental health care services and
mental health accompany the changes in health insurance coverage rates that occur at the
onset of Medicare. This research question relates to several strands of literature. The first
examines changes in health care utilization after becoming eligible for Medicare coverage.
The second investigates the relationship between cost-sharing requirements and mental




Two studies have tested for discontinuous changes in health care utilization at the age
65 Medicare eligibility threshold (Decker, 2005; Card et al., 2008). The closest study to
this one is Card et al. (2008), who use data from the National Health Insurance Survey
for the years 1992-2003 to test for discontinuous changes in health care utilization and
health outcomes. They find that individuals from lower socioeconomic groups have more
doctors’ visits and are less likely to delay care upon reaching Medicare eligibility. Among
higher socioeconomic groups, gaining Medicare eligibility is associated with an increase
in elective surgeries, such as hip and knee replacements. Decker (2005) uses 11 years of
data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System and finds that mammography
screening rates increase at age 65, especially among women from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds.
Other studies have employed individual-level panel data to examine how utilization
patterns change after becoming eligible for Medicare coverage. These studies generally
document increased health care utilization, especially among the previously uninsured
(McWilliams et al., 2003, 2007). McWilliams et al. (2003) find increased use of basic medi-
cal services, such as cholesterol testing, mammograms, and prostate examinations, among
Medicare eligible individuals who were previously uninsured. McWilliams et al. (2007)
find increased doctors’ visits and hospitalizations among previously uninsured Medicare
eligible individuals who suffer from chronic conditions such as cardiovascular disease and
diabetes.
There are several reasons why the findings from previous studies may not translate to
mental health care utilization at age 65. First, services such as mammography screenings
and prostate examinations have been widely promoted in recent years to the elderly and
the near-elderly, unlike outpatient mental health care. Second, individuals approaching
the age of Medicare eligibility may prioritize other types of costlier and more involved
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care, such as hip and knee replacements. And third, Medicare coverage for outpatient
mental health care has historically required higher levels of cost-sharing than other types
of care.
In Medicare’s original form, Congress modelled coverage for outpatient mental health
care in accordance with private insurance coverage at the time. This involved higher
copayments and increased coverage restrictions than the requirements for many forms of
physical health care (Frank and Glied, 2006). This lack of parity was driven by concerns
over the demand response for mental health care; namely, the perception that such care
was “discretionary,” and coverage requirements on par with other medical services would
induce a “cost control” problem (Frank and McGuire, 2000). As a result, Medicare
required 50 percent copayments for outpatient mental health care, as compared to the 20
percent copayments required for general medical care.
Lack of parity under Medicare remained until 2010. In 2008, Congress passed the
Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA), which required Medi-
care to begin covering a larger share of the cost of outpatient mental health services
beginning in 2010, and to phase in additional increases over time. Under MIPPA, co-
payments for outpatient mental health care were reduced as follows; dropping from 50
percent to 45 percent beginning in 2010, down to 40 percent in 2012, to 35 percent in
2013, and down to 20 percent in 2014 and thereafter (Ostrow and Manderscheid, 2010).
3.2.2 Cost-Sharing and the Use of Mental Health Services
Although copayments for outpatient mental health care under Medicare have histori-
cally been higher than those required for physical health care, gaining coverage at age 65
still results in a reduction in mental health cost-sharing requirements for many individu-
als, including the previously under-insured and uninsured. Prior studies that examine the
link between cost-sharing requirements and outpatient mental health care utilization have
found mixed results (Frank and McGuire, 1986; Manning et al., 1986; Goldman et al.,
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2006; Ndumele and Trivedi, 2011). Evidence from the Rand Health Insurance Experi-
ment suggests that price sensitivity plays an important role in utilization patterns; study
participants who were randomized into plans that covered 100 percent of care were twice
as likely to obtain any ambulatory mental health care as participants who faced a 95 per-
cent coinsurance rate (Manning et al., 1986). Conversely, Goldman et al. (2006) find that
federal employees did not increase their utilization of mental health and substance-abuse
services after parity for these benefits was introduced.
There has been limited research on how cost-sharing requirements affect outpatient
mental health care use among the elderly. Ndumele and Trivedi (2011) is a notable
exception; the study finds that utilization of mental health services is uncommon among
individuals who are enrolled in Medicare managed care plans, and that increasing or
decreasing copayments for these services has little effect on utilization patterns. Although
the study examines individuals who are 65 years of age and older, these results may not
extend to the general Medicare population given the differences in access to care across
managed care and traditional fee-for-service plans (Elliott et al., 2011; Martino et al.,
2016).
3.2.3 Health Insurance and Mental Health
The onset of Medicare could affect mental health through several channels. For the
previously uninsured, gaining coverage at age 65 facilitates increased access to the health
care system. For the previously under-insured, transitioning onto Medicare may reduce
cost-sharing requirements. Both reductions in cost-sharing requirements and changes in
coverage status could increase utilization of mental health services, potentially leading
to improvements in mental health. Gaining Medicare coverage may also facilitate in-
creased access to other types of care that lead to improvements in mental health, such as
prescription medication (Ayyagari and Shane, 2015).
Since health insurance serves as a safe-guard against high future unexpected health
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care costs, gaining coverage at age 65 may also reduce stress and improve mental health,
regardless of any changes in utilization. This resonates with findings from the Oregon
Health Insurance Experiment; in this ongoing study, previously uninsured individuals
who gained Medicaid coverage through a randomized lottery reported higher levels of
happiness, an increased connectedness with the health care system, and a reduction in
self-reported rates of depression (Finkelstein et al., 2012).
3.3 Data and Methods
This study uses data from the Person File and Sample Adult components of the 2006-
2013 National Health Insurance Surveys (NHIS). Person File data contain responses from
everyone in a family selected to participate in the NHIS. Among other topics, participants
answer questions regarding their age, their race and ethnicity, their health insurance
status, and their education. The Sample Adult file is comprised of a subset of individuals
from the Person File component; one adult from each family is chosen at random to answer
additional questions relating to their health care utilization, their health conditions, and
their behavior.
Answers to several questions from the Sample Adult component of the NHIS form the
key outcomes used in this analysis. To assess perceived financial barriers to mental health
care, participants were asked if there was any time during the past 12 months that they
needed mental health care or counseling but did not receive it because they could not
afford the costs of care. To gauge mental health care utilization, participants were asked
if they had seen or spoken to a mental health professional during the past 12 months.
Mental health professionals listed include psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric nurses,
and clinical social workers. The Kessler K6 nonspecific distress scale is used as a proxy
for mental health.
The Person File data contain several key age fields, including birth month, birth year,
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and age in years at the time of the interview; an age-in-quarters field is constructed from
these fields.1 Following Card et al. (2008), the analysis begins by limiting the sample to
survey respondents who are between the ages of 55 and 74. After merging the Person File
and Sample Adult components, limiting the sample to adults between the ages of 55 and
74, and dropping a small fraction of observations with missing entries, the final sample
consists of 55,586 observations.
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics of the sample; overall demographic, regional, and
educational characteristics appear in the top panel, while health insurance, employment,
and mental health outcomes are stratified by age group in the bottom panel. The sample
means for insurance coverage and employment status suggest stark differences between
those aged 55 to 64 and individuals between 65 and 74. The percent of individuals who
saw a mental health professional during the past year is 3.4 percentage points lower among
the older age group. The fraction of respondents who needed mental health care but did
not obtain such care because of costs decreases with age; less than 1 percent of individuals
over 65 report this outcome. Kessler K6 scores decline, dropping from 2.6 among 55- to
64-year-olds to 2 among individuals between the ages of 65 and 74. These scores align with
previous studies that document declining rates of mental illness beginning with individuals
in their late-twenties and early-thirties (Kessler et al., 2005; Neighbors et al., 2007).
3.3.1 Data Analytic Procedures
Equation 3.1 is estimated to test for changes in health insurance coverage rates, the
utilization of mental health care services, and mental health at age 65.
1More detail on the construction of the age-in-quarters field is presented in section C.2.
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Yi = β0 + β1(AgeQi − 260) + β2(AgeQi − 260)2 + β3D65i + β4(AgeQi − 260)×D65i
+ β5(AgeQi − 260)2 ×D65i +XTi β + i (3.1)
Yi represents outcomes of interest, including respondent i’s health insurance coverage,
access to mental health care, and K6 scores. AgeQi is respondent i’s age-in-quarters.
260 (4*65) is subtracted from the age-in-quarters field to allow for ease of interpretation.
β3 is the coefficient of interest and captures the average treatment effect at the onset of
Medicare eligibility at age 65 (and zero quarters). Quadratic age-in-quarters terms allow
for curvature on either side of the age 65 cutoff. The term X includes controls for sample
year, as well as a vector of covariates that may be correlated with age and the outcome
fields, including gender, region, race, ethnicity, and education level.
Because the data derive from a complex national survey, all observations contain
sample weights, primary sampling units, and stratum identification. Sample weights are
included in all analyses to allow for nationally representative estimates; they inflate each
observation by adjusting for non-response and over-sampling, and by incorporating U.S.
census population estimates of age, gender, race, and ethnicity. Data years 2006-2013 all
derive from the same NHIS sample design, which facilitates proper variance estimation in
pooled analysis (CDC, 2016). All analysis incorporates survey design estimation features,
including adjustments for subpopulation variance estimates. Models are estimated via
ordinary least squares; Equation 3.1 thus represents a linear probability model when
modelling all outcomes except for those that pertain to the K6 index.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Health Insurance Coverage
Table 3.2 contains discontinuity estimates for health insurance outcomes at age
65. Odd-numbered columns contain the mean of each outcome for 64-year-olds; even-
numbered columns present the discontinuity estimate (β3) from Equation 3.1. In addition
to presenting results from the overall sample of adults aged 55 to 74 years of age, Table
3.2 also includes age 64 means and estimates of β3 when the sample is stratified by level
of education. These estimates correspond with graphs A.-C. in Figure 3.1.
The discontinuity estimates on the entire sample of 55- to 74-year-olds show that health
insurance coverage rates increase by 9.8 percentage points at age 65. This represents an
11 percent increase in coverage rates from the age 64 mean of 88.1 percent. In addition to
changes in overall coverage rates, there are also shifts in types of coverage at age 65. The
probability of being on Medicare increases by 65.5 percentage points, while the probability
of having private coverage decreases by 10.2 percentage points.
There are heterogeneous effects across education groups. While 92.1 percent of 64-
year-olds with at least some college education are insured, only 71.6 percent of 64-year-old
high school dropouts have any form of coverage. This finding aligns with previous age 65
discontinuity studies that document higher uninsurance rates among lower socioeconomic
groups prior to the age 65 threshold (Decker, 2005; Card et al., 2008). The largest gains in
coverage occur among high-school dropouts; this group exhibits a 22.1 percentage point
increase in coverage rates, which represents a 31 percent increase from the age 64 mean.
Coverage rates increase by 8.8 percentage points among high school dropouts and 6.9
percentage points among those with some college.
All three education groups exhibit large gains in Medicare coverage rates at age 65,
ranging from a 56.3 percentage point increase among high school dropouts to a 68.9
percentage point increase among individuals with some college education. The overall
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decline in private coverage rates is driven by an 8.5 percentage point drop among high
school graduates and a 13.9 percentage point decline among individuals with at least some
college education. The estimate of 0.04 among high school dropouts implies that private
insurance coverage rates do not change for this group, although this estimate is noisy.
The health insurance discontinuity estimates highlight that changes in coverage rates
among high school graduates and individuals with some college result from both gaining
Medicare coverage and shifting out of private plans. Transitioning from private insurance
to Medicare may affect mental health care utilization if private plans offer differing access
to provider networks or cost-sharing requirements. As a result, mental health discontinuity
estimates that correspond to these groups may capture both the impact of gaining health
insurance coverage for the previously uninsured and the effect of transitioning from private
coverage onto Medicare. Changes in coverage rates among high school dropouts are driven
by gaining Medicare coverage, and not simultaneously dropping private insurance.
3.4.2 Mental Health Care Utilization and Mental Health
Table 3.3 contains discontinuity estimates for outcomes on the utilization of mental
health care services and mental health at age 65. Age 64 means and estimates of β3
are again stratified by level of education below the results for the entire sample. These
estimates correspond with graphs D.- F. in Figure 3.1.
Overall, 1.7 percent of 64-year-olds report the need but inability to obtain mental
health care because of the costs of such care. High school dropouts report the highest
rates of prohibitive costs at 2.8 percent at age 64, while rates for high school graduates
and those with at least some college are both below 2 percent. The discontinuity estimates
imply that the onset of Medicare has a significant impact on reducing these prohibitive
costs. Across all 55-74-year-olds there is a drop of 0.9 percentage points, which represents
57 percent of the age 64 mean. High school dropouts report a statistically significant 2.4
percentage point decrease. The estimates for high school graduates and individuals with
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at least some college are -0.9 and -0.7 respectively. The estimate for high school dropouts
is not significant, while the estimate for those with at least some college is significant at
the 10-percent level.
Just over 7 percent of 64-year-olds saw a mental health professional during the past
year. When stratified by level of education, the age 64 means and the illustrations in
Figure 3.1.E. show that visit rates are highest among individuals with at least some
college education, in accordance with other studies that document higher outpatient uti-
lization rates among the insured population (Cooper-Patrick et al., 1999; Druss et al.,
2000; McAlpine and Mechanic, 2000). High school dropouts and high school graduates
exhibit similar age 64 utilization patterns, both just below 5 percent. The overall discon-
tinuity estimate suggests that the onset of Medicare is accompanied by a small increase
of 0.3 percentage points, although this estimate is imprecise. The discontinuity estimates
for high school dropouts and high school graduates are 0.9 and 1.1 percentage points
respectively, constituting over a 20 percent increase in visit rates from the age 64 means
for both groups. However, neither of these estimates is significant. Individuals with some
college education exhibit a small decrease in visit rates, but this estimate is again noisy.
Estimates and means of the K6 index appear in the final two columns of Table 3.3. Age
64 means and Figure 3.1.F. align with findings from previous literature that documents a
strong correlation between socioeconomic status and mental health (Kessler et al., 2005;
Neighbors et al., 2007; Donisi et al., 2013). Furthermore, the figure suggests that this
relationship persists past the onset of Medicare eligibility. High school dropouts report
an average K6 score of 3.5 at age 64, while the mean K6 score for individuals with at
least some college is almost half of that score. The discontinuity estimates indicate no
significant change in K6 outcomes at age 65. Across all 55-74-year-olds the estimate
is 0.09; this finding holds for high school dropouts and individuals with at least some
college, while high school graduates report an increase in K6 scores of 0.1. None of the
discontinuity estimates pertaining to K6 scores are significant.
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Beginning in 2010, copayments for outpatient mental health care were progressively
lowered from 50 percent under Medicare Part B, eventually reaching 20 percent in 2014.
Table 3.4 presents mental health care discontinuity estimates stratified by pre- and post-
MIPPA implementation data years. The discontinuity estimates suggest that the grad-
ual lowering of cost-sharing requirements through MIPPA has not generated significant
changes in visits or prohibitive costs at the age 65 threshold. Although the sign of the
estimate for individuals with at least some college education changes when the outcome
is mental health visits, the findings across the MIPPA-implementation time-periods are
not statistically different (P = 0.7). The only pair of estimates that are statistically dif-
ferent across time-periods occurs among individuals with at least some college education
when the outcome is prohibitive mental health care costs (P = 0.03). These individuals
report a greater decline in prohibitive costs at the onset of Medicare in the pre-MIPPA
implementation period than is reported in the post-MIPPA implementation years.
3.5 Sensitivity Analyses
Additional analyses are conducted to confirm the validity of the results.
3.5.1 Changes in Employment
A critical component of the discontinuity analysis is that no other changes occur
at the onset of Medicare eligibility that could simultaneously affect mental health out-
comes. Given that many individuals are retiring around this age, significant changes in
employment at the age 65 threshold could confound the analysis. For example, recent
retirees may have more time to focus on health, and a lower opportunity cost of accessing
providers. Furthermore, individuals may elect to retire upon turning 65 because they
no longer require the same levels of private coverage. Although previous studies have
ruled out changes in employment at age 65, these studies involved data from before the
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Great Recession, which may have altered retirement decisions (Rust and Phelan, 1997;
Card et al., 2008). Columns 1 and 2 in Table C.1 contain age 64 means and discontinuity
estimates for employment. The estimates are not significant, and the implied changes are
minor relative to the observed changes in health insurance coverage status in Table 3.2.
3.5.2 Changes in Rates of Serious Mental Illness
Although estimates from models where the K6 index is the outcome of interest indicate
no changes in self-reported mental health, these findings may not capture the impact
among individuals at the tail of the distribution. To examine this, K6 scores that are
greater than or equal to 13 are also considered as an outcome. Scores of this magnitude
have been shown to correspond with serious mental illness (Kessler et al., 2003). Table
3.1 indicates that rates of individuals with these scores are low; 4.2 percent of individuals
between the ages of 55 and 64 had a score of 13 or more, while only 2.4 percent of 65-74-
year-olds report scores of this magnitude. Furthermore, individuals who are 55-64 years
of age who obtained a score of 13 or more have lower health insurance coverage rates
(82 percent) than individuals in the same age group who obtained a score below 13 (88
percent).
Columns 3 and 4 in Table C.1 present the age 64 means and discontinuity estimates
when the outcome is binary and equal to one for K6 scores of 13 or more. High school
dropouts have the highest rates of these scores at 7.1 percent, while only 3.1 percent
of 64-year-old high school graduates and 1.7 percent of individuals with at least some
college report scores of 13 or more. The overall discontinuity estimate suggests that rates
of these scores increase at age 65 across all 55-74-year-olds by 0.9 percentage points. This
estimate is significant at the 10 percent level (P = 0.09). All three education groups exhibit
increases at age 65, ranging from 0.7 percentage points among the highest education group
to 1.4 percentage points among high school dropouts. However, none of the estimates on
the stratified samples are statistically significant. These results confirm that the onset of
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Medicare is not accompanied by immediate improvements in self-reported mental health.
3.5.3 Alternative Specification and Age Window
The regression discontinuity design emphasizes the impact at the threshold, under
the assumption that individuals on either side of the age 65 cutoff are extremely similar,
except for their eligibility for Medicare coverage. In selecting an appropriate age win-
dow, there is a trade-off between bias and precision. Observations closer to the cutoff
are more comparable, yet limiting the sample to individuals just above and below the
age 65 threshold reduces the sample size. Including additional observations further from
the cutoff increases power, but raises concerns that these observations differ along dimen-
sions other than insurance status. This often necessitates the inclusion of higher-order
polynomials in the running variable, as seen in Equation 3.1.
Given the large sample size, additional analysis is conducted using a narrower age
window and a specification that imposes less reliance on functional form. This analysis
limits the sample to individuals within 3 years of the age 65 threshold, between the ages
of 62 and 67. The local linear model that is estimated equates to Equation 3.1 without
the inclusion of the quadratic age-in-quarters terms that correspond with β2 and β5.
Table C.2 compares the original mental health outcome estimates against estimates
from the linear specification with a narrower age window.2 The findings are very similar
across models and all estimates overlap within a reasonable degree of confidence. However,
there are some discrepancies. While the overall finding of a reduction in prohibitive costs
is roughly 1 percentage point across both models, the estimate is greater in magnitude
and statistically significant among high school graduates when estimating the effect on
the narrower age window. The estimate corresponding to mental health visits among high
school dropouts is again positive at the onset of Medicare, while the estimate on visits
2Health insurance coverage discontinuity estimates are extremely similar across the two models. These
results are available upon request.
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among high school graduates declines in this model. Again, neither estimate is significant.
K6 estimates are generally consistent across models, although estimates that correspond
to the linear specification are much noisier than the estimates from Equation 3.1, likely
driven by the smaller sample size.
Despite these discrepancies, the comparisons in Table C.2 largely confirm the conclu-
sions drawn from the findings presented in Table 3.3; at the age 65 threshold, mental
health visit rates and self-reported mental health do not change significantly, while there
is evidence that the rate at which individuals face financial barriers to mental health care
declines.
3.5.4 Alternative Stratification
In addition to stratifying by level of education, analysis is conducted on a sample that
is stratified into terciles based on pre-65 health insurance coverage characteristics. This
facilitates a more balanced observation count across samples, and confirms that stratifying
by level of education accurately captures the impact across groups with varying pre-65
coverage rates.
To establish these terciles, a probit model is estimated on the probability of having
any insurance coverage on the sample of individuals who are between the ages of 55
and 64. All covariates from Equation 3.1 are included in this model. The results are
presented in Table C.3. Predicted probabilities of having any health insurance coverage
are then generated from these results on the entire sample of 55-74-year-olds. The sample
is stratified into terciles based on these predicted probabilities.
Table C.4 contains mental health outcome discontinuity estimates from Equation 3.1
when the sample is stratified into these terciles. Individuals from tercile 1 possess demo-
graphic characteristics that are associated with higher uninsurance rates prior to Medicare
eligibility. At age 64, these individuals report the highest rates of financial barriers to
care, the lowest rates of mental health visits, and the highest K6 scores. These individuals
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exhibit a significantly estimated 2 percentage point reduction in financial barriers to care
at age 65. Individuals from tercile 2 also report a 1 percentage point reduction in financial
barriers to care; this estimate is significant at the 10 percent level. None of the estimates
corresponding to mental health visits or K6 scores are significant. These results generally
align with the findings from Table 3.3.
3.6 Discussion
This study adds to a literature that investigates the immediate impact of Medicare
eligibility on health care utilization by testing whether the changes in coverage rates that
occur at age 65 correspond with changes in the utilization of mental health care services
and mental health. Overall, there is no significantly estimated change in mental health
visits or K6 scores; however, at age 65 there is a 57 percent decline from the age 64 rate
in the probability of needing mental health care but not obtaining such care because of
prohibitive costs.
The overall estimates mask heterogeneity across level of education. High school grad-
uates and individuals with at least some college education show gains in health insurance
coverage rates at age 65. However, the overall gains are accompanied by declines in private
coverage rates. As a result, it is difficult to attribute changes in mental health outcomes to
gaining Medicare coverage; dropping private insurance coverage may also have an impact
on these outcomes. Despite this, it is worth noting that both groups exhibit declining
rates of prohibitive costs, although the findings are somewhat sensitive to the estimation
strategy. Future research should examine whether transitioning from private coverage
onto Medicare affects cost-sharing requirements and utilization patterns at age 65.
Because of their pre-65 characteristics, high school dropouts are most likely to be
affected by gaining health insurance through the onset of Medicare. Prior to turning 65,
individuals from this group exhibit the highest rates of uninsurance, are more likely to
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forgo treatment for mental health conditions because of costs, obtain the highest average
K6 scores, and report the lowest mental health visit rates. Additionally, changes in
coverage rates among high school dropouts are driven by gaining Medicare coverage, and
not simultaneously dropping private insurance. Previous age 65 discontinuity studies
have found the largest impact of Medicare coverage on health care utilization among high
school dropouts. These studies find effects that are both large in magnitude and precisely
estimated (Decker, 2005; Card et al., 2008).
Relative to the age 64 rate, high school dropouts report a large decline in the probabil-
ity of not being able to obtain mental health care due to prohibitive costs. This estimate
is sensitive to the age window and specification; however, alternative analysis confirms
that individuals who are more likely to lack insurance coverage prior to turning 65 also
report a significant decline in this outcome. The estimate on mental health visits among
high school dropouts is imprecise, and the null of no change in visits cannot be rejected.
However, this estimate is best interpreted in the context of other discontinuity studies,
where there is a clear and significant increase in utilization patterns among high school
dropouts identified at age 65. The cost-sharing reductions that occurred through the
implementation of MIPPA have not generated significant changes in either of these out-
comes among high school dropouts. There is no estimated change in K6 scores, and the
graphical analysis shows that high school dropouts continue to report the highest average
K6 scores after becoming eligible for Medicare coverage. There is, however, evidence that
these scores are declining with age.
There are several reasons that could explain why high school dropouts report lower
prohibitive costs but no significantly estimated change in visits. First, the estimate on
visits corresponds to changes on the extensive margin, and does not capture intensity of
use. Reductions in prohibitive cost-sharing may signify increased utilization among those
who visited a mental health professional. This outcome would not be reflected in the
estimate corresponding to mental health visits.
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Second, the question regarding prohibitive costs in the NHIS survey does not specify
mental health visits as the lone source of care. The onset of Medicare has been linked to
increased utilization of other types of health care, including doctors’ visits (Card et al.,
2008). It is common for individuals to obtain behavioral health care through primary care
physicians, especially given their ability to prescribe medications that treat mental illness
(Olfson, 2016). As a result, the estimate on prohibitive costs may capture increased access
to other types of care that facilitate treatment for mental illness. Again, this would not
be reflected through changes in visit patterns.
Third, although gaining Medicare coverage may lower cost-sharing requirements, ob-
taining care is contingent on access to mental health professionals and their acceptance
of Medicare patients. This may not be the case. For example, a recent study found that
psychiatrists are less likely to accept Medicare as a form of payment relative to physicians
in other specialties (Bishop et al., 2014). Because of this, individuals may report an in-
creased ability to afford the costs of mental health care, despite facing other barriers to
such care.
Further research exploring these potential explanations would be useful. Additionally,
although the discontinuity estimates across all three education groups suggest no change
in mental health visits at age 65, these estimates are imprecise and large effects relative to
age 64 means cannot be ruled out, especially among high school dropouts and high school
graduates. Future research that evaluates whether additional factors can explain this im-
precision would be useful. For example, location of residence, including living in a mental
health shortage area, could contribute to the noise in these estimates. Unfortunately, the
publicly-available NHIS data does not facilitate this level of analysis.
This study has several limitations. The outcomes that pertain to mental health care
involve a one-year recollection period. Because of this, 65-year-olds may recall mental
health care visits and prohibitive costs from before they were eligible for Medicare cover-
age. However, previous discontinuity studies have relied on similarly phrased questions;
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the analysis in Card et al. (2008) involves a one-year recollection period, while the analysis
in Decker (2005) involves a two-year recollection period. Both studies found significant
changes in utilization patterns among high school dropouts at age 65. It is unclear why
recollection of access to mental health care would differ from recollection of other types
of care.
Additionally, this analysis tests only for discontinuous changes at age 65. Newly en-
rolled Medicare beneficiaries may require more time to familiarize themselves with mental
health coverage benefits. This limitation extends to the findings regarding reductions in
cost-sharing requirements through the implementation of MIPPA. Although the estimates
suggest little effect from the changes thus far, these findings capture the impact at the age
65 threshold and do not reflect changes in overall utilization patterns among all Medicare
enrollees. Furthermore, the analysis is limited to data years 2006-2013; full parity for
outpatient mental health care under Medicare did not come into effect until 2014. And
finally, although no change in K6 scores is found at the Medicare eligibility threshold,
gaining health insurance coverage and increased access to the health care system may
induce changes in mental health over a longer time-horizon.
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f. Kessler K6 Nonspecific Distress Scale
(Last 30 Days)
NHIS Sample Adult/Person File (2006-2013) Sample Weighted Averages By Age In Quarters - Quadratic Best Fit Lines
High School Dropout High School Graduate Some College
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High School Dropout 15.0%
High School Graduate 28.8%
At Least Some College 56.2%
55-64 Years Old 65-74 Years Old
Insurance
Any Insurance 87.9% 98.9%
Medicare Coverage 9.4% 93.1%




During the last year. . .
Could Not Afford Mental Health Care 2.3% 0.5%
Saw Mental Health Professional 8.0% 4.6%
Psychological Distress
During the last 30 Days. . .
K6 Score (0-24) 2.58 2.00
K6 ≥ 13 (Serious Mental Illness) 4.20% 2.40%
N (55,586) 32,746 22,840
Note: Data derive from the 2006-2013 Person File and Sample Adult components
of the National Health Insurance Survey (NHIS).
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Table 3.2: Age 64 Means and Estimated Insurance Discontinuities, NHIS 2006-2013
Outcome: Any Insurance On Medicare Private Coverage
Age 64 Mean RD Estimate Age 64 Mean RD Estimate Age 64 Mean RD Estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall (Adults Aged 55-74) 88.11 9.76*** 18.51 65.49*** 68.28 -10.19***
(N = 55,586) (0.82) (1.19) (1.34)
Level of Education
High School Dropout 71.62 22.14*** 27.58 56.25*** 35.64 0.04
(N = 9,760) (2.75) (2.92) (4.03)
High School Graduate 88.49 8.81*** 20.75 63.51*** 67.95 -8.46***
(N = 15,703) (1.49) (2.14) (2.76)
At Least Some College 92.13 6.99*** 15.15 68.95*** 76.76 -13.94***
(N = 30,123) (0.90) (1.53) (1.69)
Notes: Odd-numbered columns contain the sample-weighted average among 64-year-olds. Even-numbered columns contain estimates
of β3 from Equation 3.1. Linearized standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimates. All models are fit to data years
2006-2013 of the NHIS Sample Adult and Person File data. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **Statistically significant
at the 5 percent level; *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 3.3: Age 64 Means and Estimated Mental Health Discontinuities, NHIS 2006-2013
Outcome: Did Not Get Mental Health Mental Health Kessler
Care Last Year (Costs) Visit Last Year K6 [0-24]
Age 64 Mean RD Estimate Age 64 Mean RD Estimate Age 64 Mean RD Estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall (Adults Aged 55-74) 1.71 -0.98*** 7.32 0.29 2.18 0.09
(N = 55,586) (0.34) (0.77) (0.12)
Level of Education
High School Dropout 2.80 -2.37** 4.83 0.99 3.53 0.09
(N = 9,760) (1.09) (1.47) (0.39)
High School Graduate 1.97 -0.88 4.77 1.09 2.31 0.11
(N = 15,703) (0.63) (1.28) (0.24)
At Least Some College 1.32 -0.70* 9.15 -0.25 1.77 0.09
(N = 30,123) (0.39) (1.17) (0.13)
Notes: Odd-numbered columns contain the sample-weighted average among 64-year-olds. Even-numbered columns contain estimates
of β3 from Equation 3.1. Linearized standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimates. All models are fit to data years
2006-2013 of the NHIS Sample Adult and Person File data. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **Statistically significant
at the 5 percent level; *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 3.4: Estimated Mental Health Care Discontinuities By Pre- and Post-MIPPA Implementation, NHIS 2006-2013
Outcome: Did Not Get Mental Health Care Last Year (Costs) Mental Health Visit Last Year
2006-2009 2010-2013 2006-2009 2010-2013
RD Estimate RD Estimate Test of Equality RD Estimate RD Estimate Test of Equality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall -1.24** -0.78* (P = 0.466) 0.42 0.20 (P = 0.881)
(0.49) (0.43) (1.13) (0.97)
N 22,085 33,501 22,085 33,501
Level of Education
High School Dropout -2.09 -2.55* (P = 0.832) 1.19 0.92 (P = 0.929)
(1.66) (1.43) (1.97) (2.19)
N 4,195 5,565 4,195 5,565
High School Graduate -0.12 -1.64* (P = 0.21) 0.37 1.76 (P = 0.553)
(0.83) (0.91) (1.79) (1.69)
N 6,591 9,112 6,591 9,112
At Least Some College -1.74*** -0.02 (P = 0.03) 0.33 -0.63 (P = 0.664)
(0.62) (0.49) (1.91) (1.35)
N 11,299 18,824 11,299 18,824
Notes: Columns (1) and (4) contain estimates from NHIS data years 2006-2009. Columns (2) and (5) contain estimates from NHIS data
years 2010-2013. Linearized standard errors appear in parentheses below each estimate. Sample size appears below standard errors.
Columns (3) and (6) contain p-values from a test of equality of β3 (from Equation 3.1) across models. ***Statistically significant at the
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Notes: Each point represents a county. Lines indicate floor levels.
Sources: Census MSA-County Delinieation Files, Census Population Estimates, and CMS Ratebook and Calculation Data.
Non-Urban (<250K) Urban (>250K)
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Sources: Census MSA-County Delinieation Files, Census Population Estimates, and CMS Ratebook and Calculation Data.
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Sources: Census MSA-County Delinieation Files, Census Population Estimates, and CMS Ratebook and Calculation Data.
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Sources: Census MSA-County Delinieation Files, Census Population Estimates, and CMS Ratebook and Calculation Data.




Table A.1: Sample Restrictions
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 N
Beneficiaries 9,690,866 9,914,675 10,157,679 10,492,180 10,717,786 11,209,016 11,550,386 12,347,813 86,080,401
Not Enrolled in Part D 36,303 34,833 31,665 34,297 34,683 39,786 46,392 0 257,959
Remaining Beneficiaries 9,654,563 9,879,842 10,126,014 10,457,883 10,683,103 11,169,230 11,503,994 12,347,813 85,822,442
Current Reason Not Age 1,633,183 1,712,453 1,798,498 1,892,616 1,957,791 2,039,519 1,855,004 1,905,919 14,794,983
Original Reason Not Age 2,236,994 2,319,482 2,412,953 2,520,543 2,600,418 2,706,833 2,779,318 2,912,565 20,489,106
Dual Eligibles 1,907,584 1,955,281 2,038,690 2,130,191 2,144,038 2,200,917 2,276,242 2,452,554 17,105,497
LIS Recipients 2,160,660 2,208,061 2,297,588 2,381,340 2,416,240 2,512,449 2,592,296 2,784,597 19,353,231
Partial Part D Coverage 1,476,716 1,470,677 1,540,882 1,513,440 1,577,580 1,630,003 1,737,014 1,931,847 12,878,159
Death 400,876 393,718 402,854 411,529 416,016 428,727 433,048 486,019 3,372,787
Remaining Beneficiaries 5,432,328 5,574,642 5,678,945 5,870,214 5,974,149 6,316,246 6,513,213 7,020,554 48,380,291
Data Cleaning Drops 1,874,854 1,903,066 1,902,951 1,739,924 1,817,468 1,295,969 1,198,530 1,242,785 12,975,547
Final Cohort 3,557,474 3,671,576 3,775,994 4,130,290 4,156,681 5,020,277 5,314,683 5,777,769 35,404,744
Note: Table depicts sample restrictions. Final column contains the number of remaining observations after sample drops.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table A.2: Morphine Milligram Equivalents Conversion Table
Opioid Active Ingredient Morphine Equivalents per Milligram
Butorphanol 7
Codeine




Lozenge or Tablet 0.13
Nasal Spray 0.16
Mucosal Spray or Film 0.18




Oral or Rectal 4
Cartridge or Injection 20
Levorphanol 11
Meperidine
Oral Solution or Tablet 0.1
Cartridge or Injection 0.3
Methadone 4
Morphine
Oral or Rectal 1












*Fentanyl conversion factor for micrograms (per hour).
**Propoxyphene conversion factor from the CDC and Thiels et al. (2019).
Sources: The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and Thiels et al. (2019).
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Table A.3: The Effect of Excess Payments to MA Plans on MA-PDP Enrollment Across
Years
MA-PDP Enrollment
All Part D Enrollees Part D with Any Opioid Use
(1) (2)




























Notes: Estimates corresponds to α1 from Equation 1.5. Standard errors are
clustered at the county-level. *** denotes significance at the one-percent level;
** denotes significance at the five-percent level; * denotes significance at the
ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table A.4: The Impact of MA-PDP Enrollment on Any Opioid Use Across the Sample
Period (Part D Enrollees)
Any Opioid Use
OLS IV Exog
Mean Estimate Estimate (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Years 0.3101 -0.0258*** -0.0262 0.9813
(N = 2,251,773) (0.0018) (0.0201)
By Sample Year
2008 0.3124 -0.0192*** -0.061 0.2504
(N = 191,265) (0.0043) (0.039)
2009 0.3140 -0.0207*** 0.008 0.3968
(N = 202,992) (0.0038) (0.033)
2010 0.3153 -0.02846*** -0.022 0.7798
(N = 215,693) (0.00301) (0.023)
2011 0.3119 -0.0277*** -0.012 0.4185
(N = 251,825) (0.0024) (0.019)
2012 0.3126 -0.0255*** -0.031 0.8312
(N = 248,902) (0.0029) (0.024)
2013 0.3151 -0.0263*** -0.041** 0.4858
(N = 344,771) (0.0022) (0.021)
2014 0.3066 -0.0269*** -0.032 0.8076
(N = 374,104) (0.0023) (0.021)
2015 0.3012 -0.0265*** -0.024 0.9198
(N = 422,221) (0.0022) (0.023)
Notes: Column 1 contains outcome averages. Column 2 contains OLS
estimates of β1 from Equation 1.4. Column 3 contains 2SLS estimates
of β1 from Equation 1.6. Column 4 contains p-values from a robust
test of exogeneity (Wooldridge 1995). Standard errors are clustered at
the county-level. *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; **
denotes significance at the five-percent level; * denotes significance at
the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table A.5: The Impact of MA-PDP Enrollment on Intensity of Opioid Use Across the Sample Period (Part D Enrollees)
ln(Annual Daily MED) ln(Max Daily MED) Any Daily MED ≥ 50
OLS IV Exog OLS IV Exog OLS IV Exog
Meana Estimate Estimate (p-value) Meana Estimate Estimate (p-value) Mean Estimate Estimate (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Years 34.93 -0.0157*** -0.060 0.3389 44.29 -0.0289*** -0.049 0.6490 0.3124 -0.0154*** 0.010 0.4439
(N = 698,382) (0.0046) (0.049) (0.0049) (0.048) (0.0034) (0.035)
By Sample Year
2008 41.56 0.012 -0.37** 0.0043 53.32 -0.0044 -0.35** 0.0082 0.4299 -0.0159* -0.150** 0.0726
(N = 59,757) (0.013) (0.15) (0.0138) (0.14) (0.0089) (0.074)
2009 41.53 -0.0445* -0.278*** 0.0131 53.03 -0.064*** -0.282*** 0.0269 0.4279 -0.0435*** -0.127* 0.2225
(N = 63,746) (0.0099) (0.097) (0.011) (0.099) (0.0078) (0.067)
2010 39.74 -0.0238*** -0.080 0.3730 50.85 -0.0378*** -0.077 0.5743 0.4009 -0.0271*** 0.010 0.4347
(N = 68,000) (0.0077) (0.067) (0.0084) (0.073) (0.0058) (0.048)
2011 33.19 -0.0055 -0.019 0.7612 42.36 -0.0212*** -0.007 0.7632 0.2694 -0.0039 0.019 0.4880
(N = 78,541) (0.0064) (0.048) (0.0068) (0.049) (0.0049) (0.036)
2012 33.11 -0.0079 0.036 0.4123 42.07 -0.0161** 0.061 0.1370 0.2743 -0.0032 0.085* 0.0298
(N = 77,796) (0.0069) (0.056) (0.0073) (0.056) (0.0052) (0.044)
2013 32.61 -0.0097 0.001 0.8217 41.23 -0.0233*** 0.008 0.5109 0.2698 -0.0108*** 0.036 0.1628
(N = 108,648) (0.0061) (0.049) (0.0063) (0.049) (0.0041) (0.036)
2014 32.56 -0.0187*** -0.043 0.6152 41.05 -0.0317*** -0.023 0.8506 0.2795 -0.01596*** 0.027 0.2415
(N = 114,715) (0.0052) (0.049) (0.0057) (0.049) (0.00401) (0.037)
2015 32.25 -0.0218*** -0.025 0.9524 40.24 -0.0323*** -0.020 0.8300 0.2679 -0.0161*** 0.031 0.2926
(N = 127,179) (0.0051) (0.056) (0.0055) (0.059) (0.0039) (0.047)
Notes: Column 1 contains outcome averages. Column 2 contains OLS estimates of β1 from Equation 1.4. Column 3 contains 2SLS estimates of β1 from Equation 1.6.
Column 4 contains p-values from a robust test of exogeneity (Wooldridge 1995). Standard errors are clustered at the county-level. *** denotes significance at the one-percent
level; ** denotes significance at the five-percent level; * denotes significance at the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table A.6: The Effect of MA-PDP Enrollment on Any Opioid Use (Sensitivity Analysis)
Any Opioid Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Years -0.067** -0.057*** -0.054** -0.0258 -0.0262
(N = 2,251,773) (0.033) (0.022) (0.022) (0.202) (0.201)
By Sample Year
2008 -0.104* -0.100** -0.099** -0.054 -0.061
(N = 191,265) (0.062) (0.045) (0.046) (0.036) (0.039)
2009 -0.028 -0.022 -0.020 0.006 0.008
(N = 202,992) (0.048) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
2010 -0.059* -0.048** -0.044* -0.020 -0.022
(N = 215,693) (0.035) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
2011 -0.047 -0.041 -0.038 -0.011 -0.012
(N = 251,825) (0.033) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
2012 -0.068** -0.061*** -0.056** -0.030 -0.031
(N = 248,902) (0.033) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
2013 -0.077** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.035 -0.041**
(N = 344,771) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
2014 -0.0775** -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.034 -0.032
(N = 374,104) (0.0304) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
2015 -0.067 -0.054 -0.052 -0.025 -0.024
(N = 422,221) (0.034) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Census Region and Year FEs X X X X
Individual Characteristics X X X
County Characteristics X X
State Characteristics X
Notes: Table contains IV estimates of β1 from Equation 1.6. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the county-level. *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** denotes
significance at the five-percent level; * denotes significance at the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table A.7: The Effect of MA-PDP Enrollment on Annual Daily MED Use (Sensitivity
Analysis)
ln(Annual Daily MED)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Years -0.013 0.010 -0.024 -0.060 -0.060
(N = 698,382) (0.062) (0.055) (0.053) (0.048) (0.049)
By Sample Year
2008 -0.37* -0.37** -0.39** -0.35** -0.37**
(N = 59,757) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15)
2009 -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.35*** -0.279*** -0.278***
(N = 63,746) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.098) (0.097)
2010 -0.031 -0.028 -0.057 -0.069 -0.080
(N = 68,000) (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.068) (0.067)
2011 0.053 0.065 0.024 -0.021 -0.019
(N = 78,541) (0.069) (0.055) (0.053) (0.049) (0.048)
2012 0.113 0.123* 0.071 0.034 0.036
(N = 77,796) (0.079) (0.066) (0.062) (0.058) (0.056)
2013 0.053 0.062 0.030 0.0056 0.001
(N = 108,648) (0.061) (0.054) (0.052) (0.0503) (0.049)
2014 0.021 0.032 0.004 -0.044 -0.043
(N = 114,715) (0.063) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
2015 0.068 0.073 0.038 -0.025 -0.025
(N = 127,179) (0.063) (0.055) (0.051) (0.056) (0.056)
Census Region and Year FEs X X X X
Individual Characteristics X X X
County Characteristics X X
State Characteristics X
Notes: Table contains IV estimates of β1 from Equation 1.6. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the county-level. *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** denotes
significance at the five-percent level; * denotes significance at the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
124
Table A.8: The Effect of MA-PDP Enrollment on Maximum Daily MED Use
(Sensitivity Analysis)
ln(Max Daily MED)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Years -0.017 0.014 -0.018 -0.051 -0.049
(N = 698,382) (0.062) (0.056) (0.053) (0.048) (0.048)
By Sample Year
2008 -0.34** -0.34** -0.36** -0.33** -0.35**
(N = 59,757) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14)
2009 -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.283*** -0.282***
(N = 63,746) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.098) (0.098)
2010 -0.0531 -0.045 -0.069 -0.068 -0.077
(N = 68,000) (0.0801) (0.084) (0.083) (0.073) (0.073)
2011 0.063 0.079 0.039 -0.012 -0.007
(N = 78,541) (0.074) (0.059) (0.057) (0.0502) (0.049)
2012 0.121 0.136 0.085 0.058 0.061
(N = 77,796) (0.082) (0.067) (0.063) (0.058) (0.056)
2013 0.046 0.061 0.028 0.012 0.008
(N = 108,648) (0.061) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049)
2014 0.017 0.036 0.008 -0.026 -0.023
(N = 114,715) (0.063) (0.053) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
2015 0.058 0.069 0.034 -0.020 -0.020
(N = 127,179) (0.066) (0.057) (0.052) (0.059) (0.059)
Census Region and Year FEs X X X X
Individual Characteristics X X X
County Characteristics X X
State Characteristics X
Notes: Table contains IV estimates of β1 from Equation 1.6. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the county-level. *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** denotes
significance at the five-percent level; * denotes significance at the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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Table A.9: The Effect of MA-PDP Enrollment on Any Daily MED ≥ 50 (Sensitivity
Analysis)
Any Daily MED ≥ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Years 0.016 0.038 0.022 0.009 0.103
(N = 698,382) (0.043) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035) (0.0352)
By Sample Year
2008 -0.172* -0.174* -0.180** -0.150** -0.150**
(N = 59,757) (0.089) (0.091) (0.091) (0.068) (0.074)
2009 -0.174** -0.173** -0.184** -0.127* -0.127*
(N = 63,746) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.067) (0.067)
2010 -0.005 0.003 -0.008 0.017 0.010
(N = 68,000) (0.047) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048)
2011 0.041 0.052 0.033 0.016 0.019
(N = 78,541) (0.052) (0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.036)
2012 0.105* 0.118** 0.092** 0.083* 0.085*
(N = 77,796) (0.056) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044)
2013 0.049 0.058 0.041 0.036 0.036
(N = 108,648) (0.044) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
2014 0.043 0.055 0.039 0.026 0.027
(N = 114,715) (0.046) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
2015 0.086* 0.091** 0.073* 0.032 0.031
(N = 127,179) (0.051) (0.044) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047)
Census Region and Year FEs X X X X
Individual Characteristics X X X
County Characteristics X X
State Characteristics X
Notes: Table contains IV estimates of β1 from Equation 1.6. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the county-level. *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** denotes
significance at the five-percent level; * denotes significance at the ten-percent level.
Source: 2008-2015 20 Percent Sample of Medicare Beneficiaries.
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APPENDIX B
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C. Quantity Limit Restriction
Note: Figure presents outcome means over time, stratified by formulary type.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
SA-PDP Only SA-PDP & MA-PDP MA-PDP Only
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D. Quantity Limit Daily MED
Notes: Figure presents outcome means over time, stratified by formulary type. Panel D. is conditional on a quantity limit restriction.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
SA-PDP Only SA-PDP & MA-PDP MA-PDP Only
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D. Quantity Limit Daily MED
Notes: Figure presents estimates of β1(SA-PDP & MA-PDP) and β2(MA-PDP Only) from Equation 2.1 (and 95% CIs), stratified by sample year.
Panel D. is conditional on a quantity limit restriction.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
SA-PDP & MA-PDP MA-PDP Only
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Figure B.4: Ingredient Estimates
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The figure contains estimates of θ1(SA-PDP & MA-PDP) and θ2(MA-PDP Only) from Equation 2.3 (and 95% CIs).
Sources: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.




Table B.1: Analysis of Utilization Management Rules Across All Drugs
Any UM Prior Authorization Quantity Limit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SA-PDP & MA-PDP -0.012 -0.013 -0.0131* -0.0137* 0.0021 0.0017
(0.012) (0.013) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0104) (0.0105)
SA-PDP & MA-PDP X Opioid 0.074*** 0.069*** 0.024* 0.017 0.068*** 0.066***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.023)
MA-PDP Only -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.0037 -0.0052 -0.0239*** -0.0274***
(0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0069) (0.0069)
MA-PDP Only X Opioid 0.008 0.011 -0.0091 -0.0046 0.013 0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.0060) (0.0053) (0.017) (0.017)
Outcome Mean 0.2564 0.2564 0.1413 0.1413 0.1431 0.1431
Year x Opioid FEs X X X
Year x NDC FEs X X X
Observations 4,093,765 4,093,765 4,093,765 4,093,765 4,093,765 4,093,765
Notes: The table reports estimates of δ1(SA-PDP & MA-PDP), δ2(MA-PDP Only), δ3(SA-PDP & MA-PDP
X Opioid), and δ4(MA-PDP Only X Opioid) from Equation 2.2. The sample includes all drugs that appear
throughout the data years. Columns 1 and 2 present estimates from models in which any utilization management
(UM) rule is the outcome; Columns 3 and 4 present estimates from models in which the outcome is a prior
authoization requirement; and, columns 5 and 6 present estimates from models in which the outcome is a quantity
limit restriction. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include year fixed effects fully interacted with an indicator for opioid drugs;
and, columns 2, 4, and 6 include year by NDC effects. Standard errors are clustered at the formulary level.
*p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
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Table B.2: Parent Organization Analysis
Any UM Prior Authorization Quantity Limit ln(Daily MED)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. Main Results Replication
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.041 0.037 0.037 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.045* 0.042* 0.043* -0.036 -0.024 -0.0069
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.024) (0.0204)
MA-PDP Only -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.0124 -0.0099 -0.0098 -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.059*** -0.042*** -0.033***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.0093) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.014) (0.012)
Outcome Mean* 0.4623 0.4623 0.4623 0.1145 0.1145 0.1145 0.4161 0.4161 0.4161 169.77 169.77 169.77
Year FEs X X X X
Year x Ing FEs X X X X
Year x NDC FEs X X X X
B. Parent Organization Controls
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.026 0.025 0.019 -0.012 -0.011 -0.019 0.042** 0.040** 0.041 -0.041 0.005 0.007
(0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.026) (0.013) (0.011)
MA-PDP Only 0.019 0.014 0.007 0.0149 0.0126 -0.005 0.015 0.009 0.010 -0.023 -0.0117 -0.0057
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.0102) (0.0099) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.015) (0.0071) (0.0076)
Outcome Mean* 0.4623 0.4623 0.4623 0.1145 0.1145 0.1145 0.4161 0.4161 0.4161 169.77 169.77 169.77
Year x Par Org FEs X X X X
Year x Par Org x Ing FEs X X X X
Year x Par Org x NDC FEs X X X X
Observations 165,535 165,535 165,535 165,535 165,535 165,535 165,535 165,535 165,535 68,882 68,882 68,882
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 (SA-PDP & MA-PDP) and β2 (MA-PDP Only) from Equation 2.1. The analysis is limited to Part D formularies that are unique to one parent organization.
Panel A. replicates the main results from Table 2.2 on the limited sample. Panel B. includes an additional layer of parent organization controls. Columns 1, 2, and 3 present estimates from models in
which any utilization management (UM) rule is the outcome; Columns 4, 5, and 6 present estimates from models in which the outcome is a prior authoization requirement; columns 7, 8, and 9 present
estimates from models in which the outcome is a quantity limit restriction; and, columns 10, 11, and 12 present estimates from models in which the outcome is the natural logarithm of the maximum daily
morphine equivalent dosage (MED) allowance, conditional on a quantity limit restriction. Columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 include year (by parent organization effects); columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 include year (by
parent organization) by ingredient effects (ex...“oxycodone X 2011”); and, columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 include year (by parent organization) by NDC effects. Standard errors are clustered at the formulary level.
*p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
*The means corresponding to Daily MED are not log-transformed.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
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Table B.3: Analysis of Opioid Utilization Management Rules Across Sample Years
Any UM Prior Authorization Quantity Limit ln(Daily MED)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2008
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.089* 0.085* 0.083 -0.010 -0.013 -0.021 0.107** 0.104** 0.109** -0.27** -0.129** -0.069*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.11) (0.062) (0.042)
MA-PDP Only 0.027 0.026 0.027 -0.0155 -0.0145 -0.014 0.037 0.035 0.036 -0.302*** -0.135** -0.088**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.0303) (0.0301) (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.102) (0.055) (0.041)
Outcome Mean* 0.2516 0.2516 0.2516 0.0969 0.0969 0.0969 0.1769 0.1769 0.1769 170.42 170.42 170.42
Observations 38,890 38,890 38,890 38,890 38,890 38,890 38,890 38,890 38,890 6,880 6,880 6,880
2009
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.065 0.061 0.061 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012 0.079* 0.075 0.076 -0.149* -0.066* -0.046
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.085) (0.035) (0.029)
MA-PDP Only 0.012 0.009 0.007 -0.019 -0.018 -0.014 0.024 0.022 0.017 -0.145 -0.040 -0.031
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.072) (0.029) (0.024)
Outcome Mean* 0.2834 0.2834 0.2834 0.0706 0.0706 0.0706 0.2486 0.2486 0.2486 184.11 184.11 184.11
Observations 37,389 37,389 37,389 37,389 37,389 37,389 37,389 37,389 37,389 9,296 9,296 9,296
2011
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.059 0.056 0.051 -0.015 -0.018 -0.023 0.057 0.054 0.051 -0.078 0.011 0.0222
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.097) (0.062) (0.0601)
MA-PDP Only -0.055 -0.053 -0.057 -0.028 -0.025 -0.025 -0.046 -0.046 -0.049 0.022 0.011 0.019
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.084) (0.038) (0.034)
Outcome Mean* 0.3591 0.3591 0.3591 0.1037 0.1037 0.1037 0.3198 0.3198 0.3198 193.21 193.21 193.21
Observations 29,006 29,006 29,006 29,006 29,006 29,006 29,006 29,006 29,006 9,275 9,275 9,275
Ingredient FEs X X X X
NDC FEs X X X X
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Table B.3, Continued
Any UM Prior Authorization Quantity Limit ln(Daily MED)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2013
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.047 0.041 0.046 0.019 0.0019 -0.004 0.065 0.061 0.066 0.1429*** 0.058 0.061
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.072) (0.074) (0.073) (0.046) (0.049) (0.039)
MA-PDP Only 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.0153 0.0103 0.0078 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.017 -0.032 -0.0318
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.0098) (0.0077) (0.0067) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.029) (0.025) (0.0203)
Outcome Mean* 0.6643 0.6643 0.6643 0.1218 0.1218 0.1218 0.6332 0.6332 0.6332 167.303 167.303 167.303
Observations 33,878 33,878 33,878 33,878 33,878 33,878 33,878 33,878 33,878 21,452 21,452 21,452
2015
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.1253 0.145* 0.136* -0.008 -0.0103 -0.014 -0.088** -0.046 -0.0392
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.0806) (0.079) (0.075) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.043) (0.032) (0.0303)
MA-PDP Only -0.121*** -0.117*** -0.1201*** -0.016 0.0015 0.0013 -0.133*** -0.129*** -0.135*** -0.0579* -0.045* -0.039*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.014) (0.0094) (0.0084) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.0303) (0.023) (0.022)
Outcome Mean* 0.8175 0.8175 0.8175 0.1870 0.1870 0.1870 0.7762 0.7762 0.7762 167.303 167.303 167.303
Observations 31,382 31,382 31,382 31,382 31,382 31,382 31,382 31,382 31,382 24,360 24,360 24,360
Ingredient FEs X X X X
NDC FEs X X X X
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 (SA-PDP & MA-PDP) and β2 (MA-PDP Only) from Equation 2.1, stratified by sample years. The sample includes prescription
opioids that appear throughout the data years. Columns 1, 2, and 3 present estimates from models in which any utilization management (UM) rule is the outcome; Columns
4, 5, and 6 present estimates from models in which the outcome is a prior authoization requirement; columns 7, 8, and 9 present estimates from models in which the outcome
is a quantity limit restriction; and, columns 10, 11, and 12 present estimates from models in which the outcome is the natural logarithm of the maximum daily morphine
equivalent dosage (MED) allowance, conditional on a quantity limit restriction. Columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 include year fixed effects; columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 include ingredient by
year effects (ex...“oxycodone X 2011”); and, columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 include year by NDC effects. Standard errors are clustered at the formulary level. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05,
*** p< 0.01.
*The means corresponding to Daily MED are not log-transformed.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
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SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.110*** 0.028
(0.033) (0.042)
MA-PDP Only -0.023 0.019
(0.029) (0.037)
Outcome Mean 0.8244 0.9176
Observations 1,105 1,105
Codeine
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.00045 0.000026
(0.00050) (0.0000031)
MA-PDP Only -0.0015 -0.000089
(0.0015) (0.000091)
Outcome Mean 0.9991 0.9999
Observations 1,105 1,105
Dihydrocodeine
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.159*** 0.194**
(0.048) (0.088)
MA-PDP Only 0.052 0.078
(0.036) (0.098)
Outcome Mean 0.5466 0.6279
Observations 1,105 1,105
Fentanyl
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.241** 0.0033
(0.0099) (0.0023)
MA-PDP Only 0.0125 0.0014
(0.0099) (0.018)
Outcome Mean 0.9900 0.9984
Observations 1,105 1,105
Hydrocodone
SA-PDP & MA-PDP – –
MA-PDP Only – –









SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.00005 0.0000019
(0.00061) (0.000051)
MA-PDP Only -0.0026 -0.000061
(0.0018) ((0.000045)
Outcome Mean 0.9982 0.9999
Observations 1,105 1,105
Levorphanol
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.206*** 0.233***
(0.043) (0.079)
MA-PDP Only 0.026 0.093
(0.035) (0.083)
Outcome Mean 0.7059 0.7642
Observations 1,105 1,105
Meperidine
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.0339 0.039
(0.0401) (0.056)
MA-PDP Only 0.015 0.107**
(0.029) (0.053)
Outcome Mean 0.5385 0.5222
Observations 1,105 1,105
Methadone
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.0006 0.0039
(0.012) (0.028)
MA-PDP Only -0.059*** -0.0103**
(0.011) (0.0041)
Outcome Mean 0.9602 0.9964
Observations 1,105 1,105
Morphine
SA-PDP & MA-PDP – –
MA-PDP Only – –
Outcome Mean 1 1
Observations 1,105 1,105
Nalbuphine
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.154*** 0.202**
(0.051) (0.080)
MA-PDP Only 0.059 0.119
(0.037) (0.081)









SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.1424*** 0.132*
(0.047) (0.072)
MA-PDP Only 0.056* 0.098
(0.033) ((0.061)
Outcome Mean 0.4262 0.4571
Observations 1,105 1,105
Opium (2008)
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.065 0.25
(0.107) (0.21)
MA-PDP Only -0.089 -0.15
(0.085) (0.24)
Outcome Mean 0.4076 0.6185
Observations 211 211
Oxycodone
SA-PDP & MA-PDP – –
MA-PDP Only – –
Outcome Mean 1 1
Observations 1,105 1,105
Oxymorphone
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.1939*** 0.101
(0.0501) (0.106)
MA-PDP Only 0.077** 0.136*
(0.037) (0.077)
Outcome Mean 0.6154 0.7294
Observations 1,105 1,105
Pentazocine
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.171*** 0.195**
(0.047) (0.079)
MA-PDP Only 0.061* 0.123*
(0.032) (0.063)
Outcome Mean 0.4109 0.4411
Observations 1,105 1,105
Propoxyphene (< 2011)
SA-PDP & MA-PDP -0.032 -0.0026
(0.030) (0.0094)
MA-PDP Only -0.158*** -0.1764**
(0.027) (0.087)









SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.1521*** 0.014
(0.057) (0.12)
MA-PDP Only 0.028 0.02
(0.037) (0.0.11)
Outcome Mean 0.3546 0.3693
Observations 894 894
Tramadol
SA-PDP & MA-PDP – –
MA-PDP Only – –




Notes: The table reports estimates of θ1(SA-PDP &
MA-PDP) and θ2(MA-PDP Only) from Equation 2.3.
The unit of observation is the formulary-year. Esti-
mates in column 1 are unweighted, while estimates
in column 2 are weighted by the number of Medicare
enrollees within Part D plans that correspond to for-
mularies. Opium products appear on Part D formula-
ries only during 2008; propoxyphene products appear
on Part D formularies prior to 2011 (2008 and 2009);
tapentadol products appear on Part D formularies af-
ter 2008 (2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015). Robust stan-
dard errors are included in parentheses. *p< 0.10, **
p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
Sources: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary,
Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files,
and CMS Plan Enrollment Files.
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Table B.5: Analysis of Propoxyphene Drugs and Non-Propoxyphene Opioids (2008 & 2009)
Any UM Prior Authorization Quantity Limit ln(Daily MED)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. Propoxyphene Drugs
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.028 – 0.035 -0.049 – -0.058 0.078 – 0.094* -0.022 – -0.115***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.037) (0.034) (0.041) (0.039) (0.036) (0.041)
MA-PDP Only 0.012 – 0.015 -0.072* – -0.077** 0.088** – 0.096** -0.033 – -0.089**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.037) (0.034) (0.041) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037)
Outcome Mean* 0.2619 0.2619 0.2619 0.0540 0.0540 0.0540 0.2100 0.2100 0.2100 140.52 140.52 140.52
Observations 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,757 579 579 579
B. Non-Propoxyphene Opioids
Opioids
SA-PDP & MA-PDP 0.080** 0.076** 0.074** -0.008 -0.010 -0.016 0.095*** 0.091*** 0.093*** -0.201*** -0.090** -0.049*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.069) (0.035) (0.026)
MA-PDP Only 0.019 0.018 0.017 -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 0.028 0.026 0.024 -0.2105*** -0.077*** -0.051**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.0606) (0.028) (0.022)
Outcome Mean* 0.2674 0.2674 0.2674 0.0852 0.0852 0.0852 0.2121 0.2121 0.2121 179.69 179.69 179.69
Observations 73,522 73,522 73,522 73,522 73,522 73,522 73,522 73,522 73,522 15,597 15,597 15,597
Year FEs X X X X
Year x Ing FEs X X X X
Year x NDC FEs X X X X
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 (SA-PDP & MA-PDP) and β2 (MA-PDP Only) from Equation 2.1. The sample includes prescription opioids that appear on Part D
formularies during 2008 and 2009. Panel A corresponds to the sample of propoxyphene NDCs that appear during these data years, while panel B corresponds to the sample of
non-propoxyphene opioids during these years. Columns 1, 2, and 3 present estimates from models in which any utilization management (UM) rule is the outcome; Columns 4,
5, and 6 present estimates from models in which the outcome is a prior authoization requirement; columns 7, 8, and 9 present estimates from models in which the outcome is a
quantity limit restriction; and, columns 10, 11, and 12 present estimates from models in which the outcome is the natural logarithm of the maximum daily morphine equivalent
dosage (MED) allowance, conditional on a quantity limit restriction. Columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 include year fixed effects; columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 include ingredient by year effects
(ex...“oxycodone X 2011”); and, columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 include year by NDC effects. Standard errors are clustered at the formulary level. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
*The means corresponding to Daily MED are not log-transformed.
Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary, Pharmacy Network, and Pricing Information Files.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Changes in the Utilization of Mental





Table C.1: Age 64 Means and Estimated Discontinuities for Alternative Outcomes,
NHIS 2006-2013
Outcome: Employed Kessler K6 ≥ 13
(Serious Mental Illness)
Age 64 Mean RD Estimate Age 64 Mean RD Estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall (Adults Aged 55-74) 40.59 1.22 2.91 0.87*
(N = 55,586) (1.47) (0.53)
Level of Education
High School Dropout 26.27 -3.84 7.09 1.39
(N = 9,760) (3.25) (2.03)
High School Graduate 36.67 3.19 3.14 0.75
(N = 15,703) (2.84) (1.05)
At Least Some College 46.08 1.76 1.74 0.73
(N = 30,123) (2.03) (0.50)
Notes: Odd-numbered columns contain the sample-weighted average among 64-year-olds. Even-
numbered columns contain estimates of β3 from Equation 3.1. Linearized standard errors appear
in parentheses below the estimates. All models are fit to data years 2006-2013 of the NHIS Sample
Adult and Person File data. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **Statistically
significant at the 5 percent level; *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table C.2: Estimated Mental Health Discontinuities Across Age Windows and Models, NHIS 2006-2013
Outcome: Did Not Get Mental Health Mental Health Kessler
Care Last Year (Costs) Visit Last Year K6 [0-24]
RD Estimate RD Estimate RD Estimate
10 Year Window 3 Year Window 10 Year Window 3 Year Window 10 Year Window 3 Year Window
(55-74) (62-67) (55-74) (62-67) (55-74) (62-67)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall -0.98*** -1.02** 0.29 -0.83 0.09 0.28
(0.34) (0.41) (0.77) (0.88) (0.12) (0.60)
N 55,586 17,154 55,586 17,154 55,586 17,154
Level of Education
High School Dropout -2.37** -1.64 0.99 1.51 0.09 0.29
(1.09) (1.26) (1.47) (1.81) (0.39) (2.38)
N 9,760 2,967 9,760 2,967 9,760 2,967
High School Graduate -0.88 -1.79** 1.09 -1.34 0.11 0.97
(0.63) (0.73) (1.28) (1.58) (0.24) (1.14)
N 15,703 4,782 15,703 4,782 15,703 4,782
At Least Some College -0.70* -0.47 -0.25 -1.12 0.09 -0.06
(0.39) (0.51) (1.17) (1.36) (0.13) (0.58)
N 30,123 9,405 30,123 9,405 30,123 9,405
Specification Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear
Notes: Columns (1), (3), and (5) contain estimates of β3 from Equation 3.1; these estimates correspond with the discontinuity estimates presented
in Table 3. Columns (2), (4), and (6) come from a local linear model estimated on the sample of 62-67-year-olds. Linearized standard errors appear
below the estimates. Sample sizes appear below the standard errors. All models are fit to data years 2006-2013 of the NHIS Sample Adult and Person
File data. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **Statistically significant at the 5 percent level; *Statistically significant at the 10 percent
level.
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High School Graduate 0.322***
(0.0311)











Notes: Linearized standard errors appear
below the estimates. Model also includes
dummy variables for survey year. Model
is fit to data years 2006-2013 of the NHIS
Sample Adult and Person File data on 55-
64-year-olds. ***Statistically significant at
the 1 percent level; **Statistically signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level; *Statistically
significant at the 10 percent level.
147
Table C.4: Age 64 Means and Estimated Mental Health Discontinuities by Predicted Insurance Tercile, NHIS 2006-2013
Outcome: Did Not Get Mental Health Mental Health Kessler
Care Last Year (Costs) Visit Last Year K6 [0-24]
Age 64 Mean RD Estimate Age 64 Mean RD Estimate Age 64 Mean RD Estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insurance Probability Tercile
Tercile 1 3.08 -2.06** 4.96 0.07 3.04 0.02
(N = 18,550) (0.79) (1.13) (0.26)
Tercile 2 1.88 -1.05* 6.80 0.54 1.99 0.19
(N = 18,988) (0.61) (1.32) (0.18)
Tercile 3 0.69 -0.21 9.29 0.20 1.78 0.04
(N = 18,048) (0.37) (1.42) (0.14)
Notes: Tercile assignment is based on predicted probabilities from the estimates in Table C.3. Odd-numbered columns contain the
sample-weighted average among 64-year-olds. Even-numbered columns contain estimates of β3 from Equation 3.1. Linearized standard
errors appear in parentheses below the estimates. All models are fit to data years 2006-2013 of the NHIS Sample Adult and Person
File data. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **Statistically significant at the 5 percent level; *Statistically significant
at the 10 percent level.
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C.2 Note on the Age-In-Quarters Field
The constructed age-in-quarters field may overstate respondent age in some cases. For
example, a 64-year-old individual who is surveyed in January and who has a February
birthdate will incorrectly appear as a 65-year-old in the derived age-in-quarters field.
Methodology from Card et al. (2008) is used to correct for this; a uniform distribution
of interview dates is assumed, and as a result, 50 percent of respondents are assumed to
have been surveyed in the first six weeks of each quarter, and 50 percent of respondents
are assumed to have been surveyed in the last six weeks of each quarter. This results in
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